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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 
 
Natural resource wealth in Ghana is significant and has the potential to make 
important inroads into addressing poverty in the country. Since 2000, however, 
the country’s marked economic growth has not been matched by improvements 
in human development outcomes.  
This research is inspired by the desire to arrest this trend by seeking out 
opportunities for civil society to improve revenue management. The focus of the 
work is on exploring the possibilities for (1) increasing the quantity of revenues 
that remain in Ghana as a result of the exploitation of the country’s natural 
resources and (2) making sure that the revenues that flow from extractive 
industries are effectively allocated toward fighting poverty. To these ends, this 
report is focused on understanding the political economy of revenue-sharing 
agreements, budget processes, and oversight institutions in Ghana.  
Ghana’s natural resource wealth includes both established mining activity and a 
more nascent petroleum sector. Revenues from mining have few explicit 
conditions attached to them, with 80 percent of the revenues flowing into the 
Treasury’s Consolidated Fund, while the remaining 20 percent flow, in some 
form, back to the area in which mining is taking place. Revenues from the 
petroleum sector are all specifically earmarked, so that 70 percent are used to 
support the budget, focusing on specific sectors. The remaining 30 percent of 
revenues are split between two funds, one focused on saving for future 
generations and one focused on smoothing price volatility.  
Mining policy in Ghana is characterized by its reform under conditions of 
structural adjustment in which it was seen as a means to attract foreign 
investment and drive poverty reduction. The result is that the country offers 
numerous allowances and concessions to mining companies. 
Accountability within both the mining and petroleum sectors is undermined by the 
extent to which decision-making is dominated by the executive branch of 
government. This dominance persists in the petroleum sector despite the fact 
that petroleum revenues are governed by specific, purpose-built legislation 
intended to improve accountability. Problems include legislation (namely, the 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act) that affords the executive branch too 
much discretionary power, and an oversight body (the Public Interest and 
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Accountability Committee) that has historically been compromised by lack of 
resources and authority, and that also generally lacks support from Parliament. 
Because 80 percent of mining revenues in Ghana enter the central budget, 
understanding revenue management in the country requires some understanding 
of the budget process. On paper, Ghana’s budget process seems controlled, 
consultative, and robust. In practice, however, it is compromised by significant 
levels of unpredictability regarding revenue flows (both from aid and from natural 
resources), which result in the need for flexible budget procedures that make 
auditing a challenge. In this regard the annual audit of national accounts suffers 
from significant delays. In addition, although Parliament has to approve the 
annual budget as well as any amendments, Parliament is, on the whole, thought 
to be incapable of performing this role because it lacks both the capacity and 
necessary incentives. The result is that the process of budget priority setting is 
dominated by the executive branch, and few effective controls exist to oversee 
expenditure—leading to significant overspending, especially during election 
periods.  
Overall, the process of allocating revenues from extractive industries—whether 
they be mining revenues directed through the budget or petroleum revenues 
directed through the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA)—is 
dominated by the executive. In the case of the budget, the executive dominates 
in that formal allowances empower the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning1 (MFEP) to determine budget ceilings and arbitrate over ministerial 
budgets. In the case of the PRMA, the dominance of the executive is due to 
contradictions in the act, as well as formal discretionary allowances afforded to 
the executive. In this context, an excessively broad list of priority sectors and 
weak oversight combine to afford the executive significant control over where to 
invest revenues.  
Despite formal efforts at decentralization in Ghana intended to empower local 
government, the power of the executive branch has been maintained via its 
ability to appoint a significant number of local government executive officials. In 
this context, the accountability of these individuals tends to be directed toward 
those who appointed them rather than toward the constituents they are meant to 
serve.  
Given high levels of executive control, weak oversight, and significant discretion, 
accountability within the system is removed from the formal sphere into the realm 
of informal politics, where it is generally oriented upward. Individual decision-
makers (who act both to sign contracts with extractive companies and to allocate 
revenues) become answerable to their peers rather than to the public. As a 
                                                
1	  Also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Ministry	  of	  Finance’	  (MoF).	  The	  two	  names	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  in	  
this	  report.	  An	  effort	  has	  been	  made	  to	  refer	  to	  these	  institutions	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  
source	  material	  did	  so.	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consequence, decision-making is rendered subject to an internal dynamic based 
on favors owed and given between individuals within the political class.  
Problems of accountability within the extractive sector in Ghana cannot be 
divorced from broader accountability challenges in the country. In this regard, the 
general dynamic of a powerful executive branch and compliant Parliament is 
particularly noticeable. Such problems are made worse by the fact that the 
majority of oversight institutions lack prosecutorial authority and thus rely on 
Parliament to pursue, redress, or take up recommendations.  
The persistent weakness on the part of Parliament to hold the executive branch 
to account—or to force it to exercise restraint—is multifaceted. On the one hand, 
it reflects a strong culture of party discipline driven by a political cultural psyche 
of reverence to authority and to older, “Big Men.” On the other hand, 
systematically skewed incentives play an important role. Regarding the latter, it is 
notable that elections for parliamentary positions are decided through a system 
of closed party-lists that are first determined by primary elections. The primary 
process allows for vetting (and thereby sanction) of candidates that the party-
executive does not support. In addition, because elections in rural areas are 
characterized by patronage spending and vote buying, a successful election 
depends on good connections, loyalty to senior figures, and the ability to 
generate funding, as well as on securing support within the party more generally. 
Such alliances and obligations are carried into and reproduced in Parliament, 
where party loyalty translates into support for government agendas and the 
negation of any executive oversight mechanisms. 
Such conditions present a challenging context for civil society organizations 
seeking to improve revenue management. Efforts at improving institutional 
oversight have seen some significant success, including Ghana joining the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the creation of the Public 
Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) as an oversight body for the 
management of petroleum revenues. Despite these steps, however, the overall 
effectiveness of these bodies in terms of improving accountability of revenues 
management has been somewhat disappointing. Regarding civil society efforts to 
drive investments into specific pro-poor sectors, successes have been even 
more limited, with budget allocations generally not reflecting the priorities of civil 
society. Finally, the efforts of civil society to audit the state have been mixed: 
there have been some successes monitoring macro-scale budget transfers, but 
also significant frustration in trying to monitor local-level expenditures.  
A notable feature of audit efforts in Ghana is that they reveal a systematic 
dysfunction of oversight institutions. This dysfunction likely reflects the fact that 
the incentives for maladministration remain in place regardless of the increased 
threat of audit and sanction from civil society. As such, much work remains to be 
done in terms of addressing the power imbalance between the executive and 
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other branches of government. One important means for achieving this 
rebalancing could be through efforts to politicize the function of good governance 
institutions in order to strengthen them by reorienting the incentives of 
officeholders toward accountability to citizens—rather than to the individuals who 
appoint them.  
 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS 
REPORT 
 
ABFA     Annual Budget Funding Amount 
ACEP     Africa Centre for Energy Policy  
APT     Additional profit tax 
CAGD     Controller and Accountant General’s  
     Department 
CDD-Ghana    Ghana Centre for Democratic Development 
CJA     Committee for Joint Action 
CSO     Civil society organization 
CSPOG    Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas 
DCE     District chief executive 
EITI     Extractive Industries Transparency   
     Initiative 
GEITI     Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency  
     Initiative 
GNPC     Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
GSFP     Ghana School Feeding Programme 
IEA     Institute for Economic Affairs 
IFPRI     International Food Policy Research Institute 
ISODEC    Integrated Social Development Center 
MDA     Ministry, department, and agency 
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MDTF     Multi-Donor Trust Fund 
MFEP     Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
MoF     Ministry of Finance 
MLGRD    Ministry of Local Government and Rural  
     Development 
MP     Member of Parliament 
NDC     National Democratic Congress 
NPP     New Patriotic Party 
OECD     Organization for Economic Cooperation  
     and Development 
PAC     Public Accounts Committee 
PBB     Program-based budgeting 
PIAC      Public Interest and Accountability   
     Committee 
PNDC Law 84    Petroleum (Exploration and Production)  
     Law 
PRMA     Petroleum Revenue Management Act 
PUFMARP    Public Financial Management Reform  
     Program 
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The report forms part of a larger study funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation to examine the role of local institutions in the management of 
extractive industry revenues. 
The report was commissioned with the intention of creating a space for critical 
reflection on the part of Oxfam America regarding Oxfam’s engagement with 
efforts to improve natural resource management through empowering citizens to 
hold their governments to account. The views expressed in this report do not 
represent the formal views of Oxfam America. 
Oxfam would like to thank Albert Kan-Daapah and Edward Ampratwum, for 
reviewing early drafts of this work and providing useful input.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Natural resources present a potentially significant opportunity for developing 
countries. In 2013, for example, it is estimated that the 85 least developed 
countries in the world produced mineral, oil, and gas commodities (or resource 
rents2) worth a total of $645 billion—more than 4.5 times the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s official develpment assistance3 for the 
same year (Figure 3). Despite such potential wealth, however, many resource-
rich countries persist in a “paradox of plenty,” whereby, despite this wealth, the 
majority of their citizens eke out their lives in conditions of gross material poverty. 
Strikingly, many of the countries that experience the most dramatic forms of this 
paradox are also mired in corruption.  
 
Source: World Bank and OECD4.  
 
This report is part of a broader study looking at the national-level (‘local’) 
accountability systems, and the institutions that comprise them, across four 
countries: Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania, and Peru. These four countries represent 
a mix of socioeconomic and political conditions, and cover a range of levels of 
maturity in terms of the extent to which extractive industries are established. Of 
the four countries, Ghana’s extractive sector, with long-standing mining and 
                                                
2	  Resource	  rents	  are	  calculated	  as	  the	  price	  of	  commodities,	  multiplied	  by	  production	  values,	  less	  
3	  This	  total	  includes	  aid	  flowing	  to	  many	  countries	  in	  addition	  to	  those	  85.	  Note	  that	  all	  dollar	  
amounts	  noted	  in	  this	  report	  are	  US	  dollars.	  	  
4	  Author	  calculations.	  OECD:	  http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-­‐to-­‐developing-­‐countries-­‐
rebounds-­‐in-­‐2013-­‐to-­‐reach-­‐an-­‐all-­‐time-­‐high.htm,	  World	  Bank:	  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS	  &	  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD	  
Figure 3. Relative value of natural resource rents  
Natural resource rents in 
developing countries, 2012 
(approximately $645 
billion) 
Total OECD Aid, 2013 
(approximately $134 
billion) 
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relatively new oil and gas production, is considered the second most mature, 
behind Peru. 
Ghana is a country that falls squarely into the category of relative resource 
wealth. It is the second largest gold producer in Africa and eighth largest globally. 
Likewise the discovery of the Jubilee in Ghana’s waters, in 2007, constituted the 
largest off-shore discovery in West Africa over the last decade5. In this respect 
Ghana is characterized by  high levels of resource dependence, with oil and 
mining together accounting for 66% of the country’s exports, and high levels of 
resource abundance – in 2013 rents from oil, gas, and mineral production in 
Ghana were estimated to be worth $8.5 billion.6 Yet at the same time (2012), 6.1 
million people are estimated to live in absolute poverty in the country.7 
In such a context it is clear that access to extractive resources has the potential 
to finance important improvements in human well-being. Simultaneously, 
however, access to these resources creates the risk of Ghana entering the 
paradoxical state of having abundant natural resource wealth while many 
Ghanaian citizens persist in poverty. In this regard, looking at the relationship 
between human development and economic growth, a worrying trend emerges: 
significant economic growth since 2000 not being matched by improvements in 
education and health (Figure 4 – each check-mark on the line represents a year, 
1980, 1990, 2000 and 2012 are highlighted). 
 
Source: World Bank and United Nations Development Program8. 
                                                
5	  EITI	  Ghana:	  https://eiti.org/Ghana	  
6	  Note	  that	  this	  $8.5	  billion	  figure	  is	  not	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  received	  by	  the	  Ghanaian	  
government	  in	  2013;	  rather,	  it	  is	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  total	  value	  of	  resources	  (the	  resource	  rents).	  
The	  figure	  uses	  World	  Bank	  data	  and	  is	  based	  on	  a	  calculation	  of	  the	  production	  of	  commodities,	  
multiplied	  by	  their	  price,	  less	  an	  estimate	  of	  a	  “normal	  return	  on	  capital.”	  World	  Bank	  2011.	  
World	  Development	  Indicators,	  see	  pp	  187.	  
7	  World	  Bank	  poverty	  data:	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC	  and	  population	  
data:	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL	  	  
8	  World	  Bank	  data:	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.	  UNDP	  data	  made	  
available	  to	  the	  author	  on	  request.	  
1980	  
2000	   1990	   2012	  
0.5 
0.55 
0.6 
0.65 
0.7 
0.75 
200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 
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GDP/capita ($ constant 2005) 
Figure 4. Comparing economic growth and improvments 
in HDI in Ghana  
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In light of these findings, this research is concerned with understanding how to 
ensure that the wealth from extractive industries is channeled into investments 
that reduce poverty. The motivation for this research comes from the desire to 
achieve three objectives: 
1. Increase the proportion of revenues from extractive industries that 
remain in the country in which those resources are located.  
2. Increase the proportion of those revenues being allocated to the sorts 
of pro-poor investments that will best address human development. 
3. Make sure that the money that is allocated for expenditure in the 
budget actually corresponds to real resource transfers and reaches 
those points of expenditure for which it is intended. 
 
To these ends, this report focuses on (1) understanding how rules for revenue 
collection from extractives industries are set and (2) understanding how budget 
spending is prioritized. In the case of the former, the intention is to identify 
opportunities to increase the proportion of revenues being retained by the state. 
In the case of the latter, it is to understand how budget priorities might be 
influenced so that an increased portion of extractive industry revenues are spent 
on goods and services that are accessed by poor, rural agriculturalists and that 
have been shown to yield the greatest returns in terms of poverty reduction.9 
Increasing the revenue collected by developing countries and better orienting it 
toward expenditure that meets human development goals are, however, only part 
of the challenge. It is also critical that legislation is followed and that budgets are 
effectively executed. Thus, this work is also concerned with (3) understanding the 
extent to which decision-makers in Ghana can be considered accountable (or 
not) and identifying the dynamics that shape that accountability (or the lack 
thereof). This focus constitutes the title of the work -  
Even as an emerging middle-income African liberal democracy, Ghana remains 
dependent on the export of raw materials for foreign currency. As a result, the 
country is vulnerable to the vagaries of world markets for cocoa, gold, and now 
oil.10 Revenue from the extractives sector constitutes some 12 percent of total 
public revenue in Ghana. Total revenue and grants, including oil, for the 2015 
budget are estimated at 24 percent of GDP. From 1993 to 2002, Ghana’s 
revenue from mining accounted for about 10 percent of taxes, but in some years 
it reached up to 17 percent. 
                                                
9	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  (FAO),	  The	  State	  of	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  2013:	  Food	  Systems	  
for	  Better	  Nutrition	  (2013).	  
10	  These	  three	  commodities	  alone	  provided	  for	  78.3	  percent	  of	  total	  export	  earnings	  in	  2013.	  
Tony	  Dogbe,	  Follow	  the	  Money:	  Ghana	  Scoping	  Study	  (International	  Budget	  Partnership	  [IBP],	  
2014),	  8.	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The domestic political-economic context is defined by a relatively weak civil 
society, the dominance of two political parties, a powerful executive branch, and 
centralized control over the extractive sector and other economic resources. 
Contemporary governance of the extractive industry sector has been 
characterized by the liberalization of the economy based on free-market reforms 
that have been implemented over the past 30 years. Together, these features 
have shaped a configuration of extractive industry governance that features 
strong institutional disincentives and capacity challenges that work against both 
horizontal and vertical accountability.  
This report is divided into eight further sections. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
methods and conceptual framing used in the work. Section 3 describes the 
technical procedures surrounding revenue sharing from extractive industries, 
including a discussion of how these laws and policies came to be and any major 
failings in the accountability system regarding natural resource revenue 
management. Section 4 describes the budget process in technical terms, as well 
as the institutional failings within it. Section 5 explores where decision-making 
influence lies in the process of allocating revenues either through the earmarking 
process or via the budget process. Section 6 seeks to link institutional failings 
within the budget process and revenue management policy to failings within the 
broader accountability ecosystem in the country. To do so, Section 6 details how 
accountability institutions are meant to function, how they actually function, what 
the implications of their failure are, and how they have been able to resist reform. 
Turning from how power is manifest at a central level, Section 7 briefly describes 
the extent to which power has been effectively decentralized in the country. 
Finally, section 8 presents an overview of opportunities for civil society to 
influence budget priorities and drive accountability. Section 9 provides a brief 
conclusion. 
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2. METHODS AND 
CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMINGS 
To address the imperatives of this project, this research employed several 
different methodologies. Given that a core framing of the research was that 
accountability is not simply the outcome of rules but also the outcome of power 
relations,11 a major focus of the work was on documenting differences between 
what is meant to happen and what actually happens, and then explaining 
variances. Because the focus of this work was on how revenues are collected 
and how they are allocated, focus was placed on the laws and policies defining 
revenue collection and those defining the budget process. To account for the fact 
that power matters in establishing rules, to whatever extent was possible effort 
was also dedicated to explaining the political and economic contexts that shaped 
the rules governing revenue-sharing policies and the budget.  
The report is based on qualitative data collection techniques over a five-month 
period: a desk based study of published and unpublished materials; 19 
semistructured interviews with senior political figures, senior civil servants, 
academics, and extractive industry experts; and numerous informal 
conversations with a range of stakeholders. The interviews and conversations, 
listed in the Appendix, were carried out in Accra over four journeys totaling eight 
weeks, from December 2014 to April 2015. 
Secondary sources studied included publicly available material in books, 
journals, and articles that focused on making known, in a broad sense (1) 
existing knowledge of contemporary budgetary processes, (2) rule-making 
processes related to the use of EI revenue, (3) the actors and institutions 
involved in these processes, and (4) formal and informal mechanisms of checks 
and balances of the processes. It was very useful to supplement this body of 
literature with media sources, including Ghanaian daily newspapers and their 
online archives, focusing on current political and public debates concerning the 
budget, cases of maladministration, and the governance and usage of EI 
revenue. 
                                                
11	  Jonathan	  A.	  Fox,	  Accountability	  Politics:	  Power	  and	  Voice	  in	  Rural	  Mexico	  (Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  2007).	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The secondary written sources also consisted of a wealth of unpublished gray 
literature (such as conference articles and papers, governmental and 
nongovernmental reports) either available online or accessed privately or directly 
from a variety of institutions and organizations. The bulk of the unpublished data 
was formal state law explicitly related to extractive industries, budgetary 
processes, and accountability. (The “References” section of this report provides 
an overview of relevant formal state law.) 
Interviews with past and present members of Parliament (MPs), ministers, civil 
servants, and civil society stakeholders provided valuable insight into rule-making 
and rule-following processes. Nevertheless, government sources were, 
expectedly, more useful in revealing how the government wanted to portray itself 
than in documenting how rules are applied and followed. Conversely, former 
holders of high positions, opposition MPs, and others on the periphery of 
decision-making (such as MPs from rural constituencies and representatives 
from think tanks) were more candid about how things did not work—showing 
clearly the importance of collecting data from as many different angles and 
interests as possible in order to gain a satisfactory overview of the process of 
governance.  
Interview questions aimed to uncover central features of the rule-making process 
to make known the role of actors in different positions of power, and to 
understand the relations between them. While exploring what is supposed to 
happen, an important goal was to unravel what else is happening while what is 
supposed to happen is not happening. What stood out from all the interviews with 
the various stakeholders was that the formal rules of budgeting and extractive 
industry governance were only part of the game, which at times either 
dominated, or was dominated by, a range of other interests within the public 
sector.  
To explore  the role of citizen groups in accountability, the work also analyzed the 
capacity for civil society to oversee budget and revenue-sharing processes and 
to leverage moments of maladministration in order to initiate some form of 
sanction. This analysis included surveying members of civil society regarding 
what they thought were the major impediments to achieving accountability. 
Unfortunately, only six surveys were completed in full (a response rate of 27 
percent12); only the questions that received a significant number of responses 
have been incorporated into this study. In addition, the research involved a 
review of all the known projects that have sought to “follow the money” by 
reconciling budget allocations with receipts at the point of service delivery.  
                                                
12	  Although	  this	  is	  a	  low	  number	  of	  responses,	  part	  of	  this	  is	  a	  function	  of	  only	  having	  a	  relatively	  
small	  number	  of	  possible	  respondents.	  In	  this	  regard,	  outcomes	  of	  this	  survey	  should	  be	  viewed	  
as	  the	  formal	  responses	  of	  6	  members	  of	  civil	  society.	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Methodological challenges in the work pertained to the fact that a feature of 
studying the rules of extractive industry governance and budgetary processes is 
that they are debated in real time, and that respondents will want to protect their 
own interests and satisfy the researcher. This situation poses a unique set of 
challenges. Simplified, the task is comparable to that of a sports commentator 
who wants to understand the rules of a particular game while the players actively 
choose and define different sets of rules depending on positions and 
preferences. To the observer, the different “rulesˮ can appear complementary, 
contested, or contradictory. This outcome is magnified in the context of Ghana’s 
current embryonic legal framework covering the oil/gas/petroleum sector. Some 
elements were hastily written, others are now under review, others appear to 
have been ignored, and others are the subjects of litigation. Thus, answers to 
questions such as “What are the rules?” depend on whom one is talking to. As a 
result the work had to focus on contestable and emerging relations between sets 
of actors, groups, and stakeholder interests.  
In a practical sense, the biggest challenge of the interview process was the time-
consuming and often frustrating task of gaining access to informants and of 
obtaining accurate details of the contacts who were targeted for interviews, the 
scheduling of appointments for interviews, and the last-minute cancellation of 
appointments by respondents. Often, such changes meant being directed to 
someone who turned out to be inappropriate or who lacked the knowledge to 
answer our questions.  Journeys were sometimes wasted, and the team had to 
make do interviewing someone who was not originally intended.  
Literature and documentation pertaining to petroleum revenue-sharing 
agreements and formal state law can be highly complex, and typically replete 
with the specialized nomenclature of the sector, parts of which are themselves 
open to multiple interpretations. This poses particular challenges when wanting 
to decipher underlying institutional imperatives that shape such agreements. 
The identification, collection, collation, and scanning of the efforts of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) to “follow the money” was undertaken for seven full weeks 
by two Ghanaian Ph.D. students (Marshal Kala and Francis Jarawura) and a 
master’s degree student (Ben Asunki), working from and moving around Accra. 
Their work provided names and details of 22 relevant respondents for an online 
survey. The task of collecting reports proved more difficult and time-consuming 
than envisaged, and, similar to the findings of a 2014 International Budget 
Partnership report, the research assistants found that few CSOs and academics 
are undertaking noteworthy budgetary analysis—or following public revenue 
flows—in Ghana.13 This observation points to a lack of CSO expertise, to a lack 
of resources, and to difficulties in obtaining and cross-checking relevant data. 
Still, the Ghana research team could not be certain that the evidence of absence 
                                                
13	  Dogbe,	  Follow	  the	  Money,	  12–22.	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equated to an absence of evidence, and their search continued in earnest until 
the team was satisfied that all important leads were exhausted.  
The collection of such studies posed many other challenges, including the need 
to visit organizations several times; a poor internet and mail culture on the part of 
organizations, which made communication difficult; a low standard of internet 
cafes that made printing and scanning trying, time-consuming, and expensive; a 
lack of office space and resources for research assistants; frustrations over 
almost daily power cuts in Accra; a large number of unanswered and unreturned 
telephone calls; uncertainty on the part of staff at organizations as to what 
studies their institutions had participated in; frequent problems of institutions 
being unable to locate studies and reports; a general lack of electronic copies of 
past and present reports authored by CSOs; uncertainty or no knowledge as to 
the location of past reports of potential interest; and a lack of quality studies and 
secondary literature on these studies. It is significant to note that the dearth of 
useful data was not only based on what can be termed CSO capacity issues; the 
team also experienced a lack of cooperation from leading donors such as the 
Netherlands government (through the Dutch Embassy in Accra) and leading 
audit firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)—both of which rejected the 
team’s earnest and repeated requests to share audits they had either 
commissioned or authored.14 It seemed out of place that leading players at the 
professed forefront of transparency initiatives were unwilling to share data. 
Finally, it is relevant to note that the research assistants themselves had 
difficulties in recognizing and/or identifying relevant material (despite briefings 
and access to project documents) owing to the technical, detailed, and varied 
nature of relevant data, audits, and public financial management documents.  
  
                                                
14	  Both	  institutions	  denied	  us	  access:	  first,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  confidentiality,	  and	  second,	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  requirement	  to	  have	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  audits	  before	  
release.	  (Both	  institutions	  were	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  supply	  the	  names	  of	  the	  authors	  to	  the	  
team	  so	  that	  permission	  could	  be	  sought	  directly.)	  
 The Weak Link: The Role of Local Institutions in Accountable Resource Management, Ghana  | Oxfam America 17 
3. REVENUE SHARING 
IN GHANA 
This section of the report documents the technical details of how revenues are 
collected from the extractive sector in Ghana, including revenues from both 
mining and oil and gas. The section then reviews the political, economic, and 
social exigencies that shaped how these processes came to be established. 
Finally, the section discusses the oversight mechanisms that are meant to 
ensure that these processes are followed, before describing problems in this 
accountability architecture. Thus, the section looks at what is meant to happen, 
why rules were chosen, and what actually happens.  
Prior to assessing the dynamics shaping revenue sharing within the Ghanaian 
extractives sector, it is worth noting the important structural features that shape 
agreements between companies and governments at a global level—and that 
limit negotiation. For example, mining is normally taxed at a significantly lesser 
rate than oil and gas projects because mining has lower margins, higher 
exploration and production costs, and higher risks than oil and gas production.15 
Mining companies generally demand a higher rate of return (in other words, more 
favorable agreements) to justify investments, and they are normally the majority 
stakeholders. As a minority shareholder, governments have limited influence on 
mining boards.16 Globally, there tends to be a higher level of state involvement in 
oil projects, and historically, oil companies are more likely to have global 
consortium support or price support from cartels. 
MINING REVENUES 
Article 176 of the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution states that “(a) all revenues or 
other moneys raised or received for the purposes of, or on behalf of, the 
Government; and (b) any other moneys raised or received in trust for, or on 
behalf of, the Government” shall be deposited in the Consolidated Fund 
(Treasury). Revenues directed to the Consolidated Fund are available for general 
                                                
15	  In	  2011,	  for	  example,	  ratios	  of	  copper	  mining	  costs	  to	  market	  price	  were	  around	  1-­‐to-­‐3.5,	  while	  
for	  oil	  ratios	  were	  roughly	  1-­‐to-­‐16.	  See	  Paul	  Stevens,	  Jaakko	  Kooroshy,	  Glada	  Lahn,	  and	  Bernice	  
Lee,	  Conflict	  and	  Coexistence	  in	  the	  Extractive	  Industries,	  Chatham	  House	  Report	  (Royal	  Institute	  
of	  International	  Affairs,	  2013).	  
16	  Joseph	  Ayee,	  Tina	  Søreide,	  G.P.	  Shukla,	  and	  Tuan	  Minh	  Le,	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Mining	  
Sector	  in	  Ghana,	  Policy	  Research	  Working	  Paper	  5730	  (Public	  Sector	  Reform	  and	  Capacity	  
Building	  Unit,	  Africa/World	  Bank,	  2011),	  15.	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public expenditures through the budget. For mining, the revenue-sharing formula 
is as shown in Figure 1 (page 2). 
The Mining and Minerals Act of 2006 specifies the royalties, rents, and fees that 
are to be collected from mining sector operators and channeled to the 
Consolidated Fund. From there, revenues are disbursed to all sectors through 
the central budget. The royalties directed to the Mineral Development Fund (see 
Figure 1 on page 2) aim to “compensate for any detrimental effects mining might 
have in their areas of operation and to support development in the local 
communities.” 17 This amount is in addition to any other mining revenues that a 
region might otherwise receive.18  
Besides royalties paid to the republic, there are other flows that go to the 
Consolidated Fund: (1) an annual mineral right fee, payable to the Minerals 
Commission, (2) corporate tax, (3) withholding taxes, (4) capital gain taxes as 
well as dividends and various licensing fees for reconnaissance, prospecting, 
and mining leases, (5) an application fee, and (6) an annual ground rent to the 
landowner.19 Dividends are a nontax source of government revenue, paid by 
mining leaseholders and collected by the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning (MFEP). The government retains a 10 percent noncontributing share in 
every mining leaseholding, which can increase up to 30 percent. Finally, 
government revenue may take the form of voluntary, nonstatutory contributions 
that are largely tax deductible. 
The Mining Commission serves to regulate all mining activities in Ghana. The 
Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 (Act 703) and the Internal Revenue Act of 2000 
(Act 592) define tax rates and tax incentives to the mining sector and are of 
central relevance for understanding the rules of revenue collection. Ghanaian tax 
incentives (which affect revenue flows to the Consolidated Fund) are considered 
lenient; more than 800 items of mining assets are exempt from import taxes. 
Companies may enjoy double taxation reliefs (in cases where home countries 
have signed) as well as generous “carrying forward losses” that give capital 
allowances for property, plant, and machinery.20 Act 703 stipulates that royalty 
rates range from 3–6 percent, although most companies paid the lower rate until 
                                                
17	  ICMM	  (International	  Council	  on	  Mining	  &	  Metals).	  Ghana	  Case	  Study.	  The	  challenge	  of	  mineral	  
wealth:	  using	  resource	  endowments	  to	  foster	  sustainable	  development	  (2007:75).	  
18	  Commonwealth	  Secretariat/International	  Council	  on	  Mining	  and	  Metals	  (ICMM),	  Minerals	  
Taxation	  Regimes:	  A	  Review	  of	  Issues	  and	  Challenges	  in	  Their	  Design	  and	  Application	  (2009).	  
19	  Thomas	  Akabzaa	  and	  Charles	  Ayamdoo,	  Towards	  a	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Taxation	  for	  Sustainable	  
Development	  Financing	  in	  Africa:	  A	  Study	  on	  Trends	  and	  Nature	  of	  Taxation	  in	  Ghana’s	  Extractive	  
Sector	  (Draft	  Report	  for	  the	  Integrated	  Social	  Development	  Centre	  [ISODEC],	  2009),	  21.	  	  
20	  Akabzaa	  and	  Ayamdoo,	  Towards	  a	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Taxation	  for	  Sustainable	  Development,	  
28.	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March 2011, after which a 5 percent flat rate was established.21 The apparent 
generosity of this regime is also evident in the fact that in 2004 only five out of 
nine companies paid dividends, and as of 2009 only one mining company paid 
capital gains tax.22 The formal rules for collecting revenue can, moreover, be 
defined by specific Stability and Development Agreements between the 
government and mineral leaseholders.23 The MFEP can grant mining 
leaseholders permission to retain off-shore foreign exchange accounts in order to 
transfer capital, acquire property and inputs, and service debts, among other 
activities.24 
The above notwithstanding, it is important to realize that the popular view of 
mining contracts as generous as a result of these policies may be simplistic. 
Although the publicly known features of these contracts may appear the same 
(for example, a 5 percent royalty), contracts may also contain important 
confidential features that favor one party or another. As a contract expert 
explained:  
It all depends on the nature of the contract and what you put in it. There are 
flexible provisions for review of contracts, or the regime, if there is a 
substantial change of circumstances. However, in questions of resource 
royalty, or what we call the fiscal regime, or elements of the take of 
government, there is the equity component, the royalty, the rent, and the 
charges. Here, much depends on provisions for excess profits. For certain 
cases, mineral companies can be right in saying that the price of the ore or 
the petroleum is low. But there are times when they get the bonus, and the 
question here is whether there are enough mechanisms that can trigger off 
an increase … so that although you see modest priority levels in the 
agreement, if there is room for additional profit tax, then it means things can 
be properly adjusted to meet contingences. So the kind of rigidity we are 
                                                
21	  Alexander	  Kwame	  Archine,	  “Taxation	  and	  Revenue	  Management	  Challenges	  in	  Resources-­‐Rich	  
African	  Countries,	  Such	  as	  Ghana,”	  GREAT	  Insights	  2,	  no.	  2	  (2013).	  	  It	  is	  significant	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
history	  of	  auditing	  large	  gold	  mining	  companies	  onsite,	  and	  state	  institutions	  are	  reliant	  on	  EI	  
companies	  to	  forward	  figures	  on	  production,	  operations,	  capital	  costs,	  and	  cash	  flow,	  etc.,	  from	  
which	  royalty	  and	  tax	  rates	  are	  calculated.	  Ayee,	  Søreide,	  Shukla,	  and	  Le,	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  
Mining	  Sector	  in	  Ghana. 
22	  Capital	  gains	  taxes	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  	  levied	  on	  mining	  property	  sold	  above	  book	  value.	  Akabzaa	  
and	  Ayamdoo,	  Towards	  a	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Taxation	  for	  Sustainable	  Development,	  25.	  
23	  These	  rules	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  parliamentary	  approval.	  
24	  For	  example,	  a	  Newmont	  Ghana	  Limited	  agreement	  with	  the	  government	  of	  Ghana	  exempted	  
the	  company	  from	  VAT	  on	  all	  imported	  items	  and	  on	  local-­‐	  and	  foreign-­‐purchased	  supplies,	  with	  
a	  royalty	  rate	  of	  3	  percent	  (3.6	  percent	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mining	  in	  forest	  reserves).	  Companies	  that	  
invest	  more	  than	  $500	  million	  have	  a	  formal	  right	  to	  negotiate	  royalty	  and	  fee	  dues.	  Akabzaa	  and	  
Ayamdoo,	  Towards	  a	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Taxation	  for	  Sustainable	  Development,	  30.	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talking about can be modified by the kind of provision, either by legislation or 
by negotiators.25  
OIL AND GAS REVENUES 
In terms of oil and gas revenues, the 2011 Petroleum Revenue Management Act 
(PRMA, Act 815), defines central budget allocations and the rules on investments 
and savings from crude oil and petroleum, and provides for the financing of the 
national oil company. Before describing the PRMA, it should be noted that Act 
815 was under review at the time of writing this report, and amendments to it 
were passed on July 31, 2015, in the Petroleum Revenue Management 
(Amendment) Act, known as Act 89326 Timing prevented the amendments from 
being fully incorporated into this work, though footnotes or reflections have been 
added to the text where necessary to account for relevant changes. Thus, the 
analysis contained in this document pertains to Act 815. 
The PRMA stipulates that 70 percent of oil and gas revenues should go to the 
Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), with the remaining 30 percent going to 
the Ghana Petroleum Funds (PRMA, Section 19[1]). The contribution to the 
Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) is intended to support the central budget 
against commodity fluctuations and secure long-term equity. The Ghana 
Petroleum Funds comprise two funds managed by the Ministry of Finance/Bank 
of Ghana through an operational management agreement: the Ghana 
Stabilization Fund receives 70 percent of the allocation, and the Ghana Heritage 
Fund, or Savings Fund, receives the remainder.  
Regarding the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), Section 21(5) of Act 815 
defines statutory limits and discretionary powers. Section 18(2) states that the 
amount “allocated annually to the Annual Budget Funding Amount shall be 
guided by a medium-term development strategy aligned with [an as-yet 
nonexistent] long term national development plan, absorptive capacity of the 
economy and the need for prudent macroeconomic management.” As Ghana did 
not have a long-term development plan when the law was made, Act 815 states: 
[T]he budget shall give priority to, but not be limited to programmes or 
activities related to 
  (a) agriculture and industry;  
(b) physical infrastructure and service delivery in education, 
science and technology;  
(c) potable water delivery and sanitation;  
                                                
25	  Samuel	  K.B.	  Asante,	  former	  deputy	  attorney	  general,	  interview,	  January	  14,	  2015.	  	  
26	  For	  more	  details	  on	  the	  PRMA	  amendment	  act	  of	  2015,	  Act	  893,	  see	  Ghana’s	  Ministry	  of	  
Finance	  website	  at	  http://www.mofep.gov.gh/?q=reports/2015-­‐08-­‐12/petroleum-­‐revenue-­‐
management-­‐act-­‐893-­‐amendment-­‐act-­‐2015.	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(d) infrastructure development in telecommunication, road, rail 
and port;  
(e) physical infrastructure and service delivery in health;  
(f) housing delivery;  
(g) environmental protection, sustainable utilization and 
protection of natural resources;  
(h) rural development;  
(i) developing alternative energy sources;  
(j) the strengthening of institutions of government concerned with 
governance and the maintenance of law and order;  
(k) public safety and security; and  
(l) provision of social welfare and the protection of the physically 
handicapped and disadvantaged citizens.27 
 
From these 12 areas, the Minister responsible for Finance is to prioritize a 
maximum of four that will be directed by the Medium Term Development Plan 
and reviewed every three years. 
The law sets the terms by which transfers to the two Petroleum Funds are to take 
place.28 In addition, amendments to the Act now stipulate that a maximum of 25 
percent of the Annual Budget Funding Amount will be allocated for public 
investment expenditure through the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund (GIIF) 
for the purposes of infrastructure development.  
The Petroleum Revenue Management Act demands that allocations of the AFBA 
be approved annually by the Parliament; however, the Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation (GNPC) can, by law (PNDC Law 64), borrow without parliamentary 
approval to finance activities outside the programs approved by Parliament in line 
with Petroleum Revenue Management Act. Finally, the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act prohibits statutory earmarking of petroleum revenues, meaning 
that funds cannot be allocated to affected communities. 
                                                
27	  Africa	  Centre	  for	  Energy	  Policy	  (ACEP),	  Three	  Years	  of	  Petroleum	  Management	  in	  Ghana:	  
Transparency	  without	  Accountability,	  Public	  Interest	  Report	  No.	  2	  (2014),	  22.	  Worthy	  as	  they	  
seem,	  these	  spending	  priorities	  belie	  the	  fact	  that	  basic	  functions	  of	  government	  (such	  as	  
insuring	  public	  buildings)	  have	  not	  received	  adequate	  attention.	  That	  state	  assets	  have	  
insufficient	  coverage	  came	  to	  light	  in	  January	  2015	  after	  a	  large	  warehouse	  fire	  gutted	  the	  Ghana	  
Health	  Services	  Central	  Medical	  Store	  in	  the	  coastal	  city	  of	  Tema,	  resulting	  in	  an	  estimated	  
uninsured	  loss	  to	  the	  state	  of	  $90	  million.	  (See	  Kwame	  Asare	  Boadu,	  “Central	  Medical	  Stores	  Fire	  
Is	  National	  Catastrophe:	  President	  Mahama,”	  Daily	  Graphic,	  January	  15,	  2015,	  
http://graphic.com.gh/news/general-­‐news/37088-­‐central-­‐medical-­‐stores-­‐fire-­‐is-­‐national-­‐
catastrophe-­‐president-­‐mahama.html.)	  It	  was	  later	  revealed	  that	  Ghana	  has	  no	  formalized	  
insurance	  coverage	  for	  any	  emergency	  service	  personnel.	  	  
28	  At	  the	  end	  of	  2013,	  the	  Ghana	  Petroleum	  Funds’	  balance	  was	  $609.9	  million.	  ACEP	  2014:1	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UNDERSTANDING REVENUE SHARING IN GHANA 
The management of extractive industry revenues in Ghana has two key 
characteristics: 
1. Significant executive dominance over decision-making 
2. Relatively generous terms for extractive companies, most notably within 
the mining sector 
Executive dominance over extractive industry lawmaking is reflected in the 
Minerals Commission Act of 1993 (Act 450), in which the Office of the President 
is given exclusive authority to appoint all members of the Mining Commission. 
This arrangement continues a history of domestic governance of extractive 
industries being the prerogative of the executive along with experts appointed by 
the executive. This prerogative is particularly acute regarding mining: control over 
minerals was established as far back as the colonial period. This feature has 
survived numerous constitutions up to the present, and the majority of MPs 
(besides those from mining constituencies) do not oversee or influence 
policymaking regarding extractives.29  
Regarding the geographical distribution of resources to the local level, the 
dominant role of the executive likewise remains apparent through, for example, 
the very modest flows of royalties to traditional authorities (Figure 1).30 The small 
size of these payments reflects the state’s largely symbolic recognition of chiefs, 
and the institution of stools, as custodians of the land. The payment is not 
suggestive of the state recognizing chiefs’ right to accrue a meaningful source of 
income from extractive activity (Section 6).31 This practice in turn reflects a long-
term political consensus that rights should be vested in the state rather than in 
individuals or stools.32  
Explaining Ghana’s apparently generous terms by which extractive industries can 
operate requires a brief reflection on the economic history of the country. In this 
                                                
29	  E.	  Kojo	  Sakyi,	  Richardson	  Azunu,	  and	  Kwasi	  Addei	  Mensah,	  “Legislator	  Views	  on	  Knowledge	  
and	  Capacity	  Challenges	  in	  Extractive	  Sector	  Policymaking	  and	  Governance	  in	  Ghana,”	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  and	  Good	  Governance	  1,	  no.	  1.2	  (2010).	  An	  MP	  responded	  that	  
such	  issues	  are	  “best	  left	  to	  the	  expertsˮ	  (interview,	  January	  17,	  2015).	  
30	  These	  numbers	  are	  calculated	  from	  the	  Minerals	  and	  Mining	  Amendment	  Act	  794,	  (2010)	  
which	  amended	  the	  Minerals	  and	  Mining	  Act	  703	  of	  2006.	  Now,	  mining	  companies	  pay	  a	  flat	  rate	  
of	  5	  percent	  of	  royalties.	  In	  2011,	  this	  amounted	  to	  14	  percent	  of	  the	  Ghana’s	  internal	  revenue.	  
For	  figures,	  see	  André	  Standing	  and	  Gavin	  Hilson,	  Distributing	  Mining	  Wealth	  to	  Communities	  in	  
Ghana:	  Addressing	  Problems	  of	  Elite	  Capture	  and	  Political	  Corruption,	  U4	  Issue,	  no.	  5	  (2013).	  	  
31	  Despite	  this	  conclusion,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  formal	  acknowledgment	  of	  traditional	  leaders,	  
superficial	  as	  it	  may	  be,	  offers	  grounds	  for	  furthering	  the	  case	  that	  mineral	  wealth	  should	  accrue	  
to	  a	  greater	  extent	  to	  the	  populations	  living	  in	  the	  areas	  from	  which	  it	  is	  extracted.	  
32	  Asante,	  interview.	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regard, a major change in the governance of extractive industries occurred with 
the opening of the Ghanaian economy from 1983 after the adoption of structural 
adjustment programming, supported by both international financial institutions 
and major multilateral donors in the wake of a failure of import substitution and 
state-driven policies. A domestic economic crisis, coupled with a political 
environment characterized by a revolutionary spirit and political populism, 
enabled the military regime of Jerry Rawlings (Ghana’s president from 1993 to 
2001) to make a case for international aid packages and donor accommodation. 
Thus, Ghana embraced a cocktail of economic structural adjustment programing 
and was directed toward market-driven growth through privatization, 
denationalization, and the liberalization of state-owned enterprises. Domestic 
support for this process came from the Governing Council and the Provisional 
National Defense Council, as well as business leaders, entrepreneurs, and 
traditional authorities.33  
For the mining sector, these reforms had significant impacts. In 1986 the mining 
sector was reformed, and the first wave of liberalization led to the issuing of more 
than 55 gold prospecting licenses between 1986 and 1989.34 The 1986 Mining 
Law was further reviewed in 2000–2001 as part of an effort to comply with World 
Bank best international practices that were motivated by the professed benefits 
of deregulation and liberalization as a means to attract foreign investment into 
the sector. The review materialized as the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act (Act 
703), a complex 60-page document.35 This process marked a distinct shift from 
government’s role as a relatively protective owner and operator of mines to one 
in which the government’s focus was on administration and regulation.  
The change in mining governance from the mid-1980s up to 2006 was 
consequently in the direction of less state control toward a liberal regime 
attractive to companies and the private investor. As mentioned, this shift included 
lowering the royalty rate from between 3 percent and 12 percent in 1986 to 
between 3 and 6 percent in 2006. The liberal markings on the regime are also 
evident in the fact that, in 2004, only five out of nine companies paid dividends, 
and, as noted, as of 2009 only one mining company paid capital gains tax in 
Ghana.36  
Following a combination of high gold prices and the 2008 global financial crisis, 
the incumbent National Democratic Congress (NDC) government established a 
                                                
33	  For	  an	  excellent	  analysis	  of	  this	  process,	  see	  Paul	  Nugent,	  Big	  Men,	  Small	  Boys	  and	  Politics	  in	  
Ghana:	  Power,	  Ideology	  and	  the	  Burden	  of	  History,	  1982–1994	  (Pinter,	  1995),	  chapter	  3.	  
34	  Ayee,	  Søreide,	  Shukla,	  and	  Le,	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Mining	  Sector	  in	  Ghana,	  10.	  
35	  Akabzaa	  and	  Ayamdoo,	  Towards	  a	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Taxation	  for	  Sustainable	  Development,	  
18.	  
36	  Capital	  gains	  taxes	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  	  levied	  on	  mining	  property	  sold	  off	  above	  book	  value.	  
Akabzaa	  and	  Ayamdoo,	  Towards	  a	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Taxation	  for	  Sustainable	  Development,	  25.	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commission to review international revenue-sharing agreements, with a view to 
increase revenue and control for the state. The review is based on an 
acknowledgment that agreements undertaken by the previous New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) government (2001–2009) in its effort to gain advantages over 
competitors and attract investment had been lenient and company-friendly. The 
main challenge for the review committee is to improve on relatively state-
unfavorable stabilization agreements, which were written by different interests in 
past contexts.  
The current review committee is made up of extractive industry experts across 
political parties, civil society, and ministries. The basis for the commission is that 
agreements perceived as unfavorable were already in place when the 2006 
mining law was passed. Notably, the drive for reform came partly from mining 
companies themselves. Asked about the background for the ongoing 
renegotiations of revenue-sharing agreements, an expert in extractive industry 
governance and member of the current review committee explained: 
There had been no new mines at all almost since the ’30s, but with [the] SAP 
[structural adjustment program] they all started to come in. ... [T]here was a 
push to get a new mining law, and the agreements that were made were 
made in 2003, and the law was passed in 2006. So when the law was 
passed, those agreements had already been made and the terms were 
different, so there was a demand to change it, but a very gentle demand. The 
turning point since came in 2009, when the mineral price was right up, and so 
the Newmont president met our president [Ghanaian President John Mills], 
who raised the matter. So it was the mining companies themselves that were 
ready to take a look and were ready to discuss it. So it wasn’t pressure from 
the general population as such. It was a willingness of a company to open 
discussions. It wasn’t forced on them. Once we began talking, the price of 
minerals went down quite dramatically ... both the demand to change, and the 
preparedness to accept the demand, came from both sides.37 
The institutional arrangements governing revenue management from oil differ 
from those of mining, mainly because the mining sector was reformed during a 
period of structural adjustment while oil was only discovered in 2007, and civil 
society was significantly engaged in the process of drafting legislation. In this 
regard, with the discovery of oil, a rich configuration of more than 100 civil society 
groups, experts, think tanks, community-based organizations, and NGOs found 
cross-party backing and created the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas 
(CSPOG) as a means to pressure the government to improve the existing set of 
petroleum-related laws. The platform received support from the Revenue Watch 
Institute, the World Bank, and Oxfam America to boost knowledge-sharing 
                                                
37	  Former	  minister,	  expert	  on	  EI	  issues,	  member	  of	  review	  committee,	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  22,	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capabilities and technical capacity. CSPOG experienced significant success and 
managed to influence the release of draft acts by government, thereby creating 
space for public feedback.38 Following its holding of a “citizens’ summit,” a series 
of well-defined recommendations were formulated that aimed to improve the 
management of oil and gas revenues, local participation, and accountability and 
transparency mechanisms. As such, the lawmaking process was particularly 
transparent and participatory with ministerially initiated public meetings, forums, 
and media debates.39  
The platform’s influence was reflected in specific provisions in the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act (PRMA), passed by Parliament in 2011. These 
pertained to: 
! The transfer of petroleum receipts from the Bank of Ghana to government 
! The compulsory annual transfer of 30 percent of revenue to separate 
funds  
! The obligation of the MFEP to produce quarterly reports of receipts and 
expenditure 
! Provisions for the multiple auditing of petroleum accounts  
! The establishment of the Public Interest and Accountability Committee 
(PIAC) and defining its composition 
! The cessation of the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill 
! The creation of the Petroleum Commission40 through the Petroleum 
Commission Act 
  
Particularly, the setting up of the Public Interest and Accountability Committee 
(PIAC) shows government bowing to pressure from civil society; both Parliament 
and government were initially opposed to the creation of the committee. Although 
the success of creating such an oversight institution in trying contexts is notable, 
the impacts of PIAC on improving accountability have unfortunately been limited 
(see below for details). The committee’s institutional weakness demonstrates that 
it was mainly the result of civil society pressure and was not envisaged or wanted 
by government as a strong and functional accountability mechanism. It remains 
to be seen whether civil society organizations can build on their early successes 
to improve the functionality of PIAC. 
                                                
38	  Emmanuel	  Gyimah-­‐Boadi	  and	  H.	  Kwasi	  Prempeh,	  “Oil,	  Politics,	  and	  Ghana’s	  Democracy,”	  
Journal	  of	  Democracy	  23,	  no.	  3	  (2012):	  94–108.	  	  
39	  Gyimah-­‐Boadi	  and	  Prempeh,	  “Oil,	  Politics,	  and	  Ghana’s	  Democracy,”	  99.	  
40	  The	  platform	  influenced	  Parliament	  to	  not	  reserve	  a	  position	  on	  the	  commission	  for	  the	  Ghana	  
National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	  (GNPC)	  owing	  to	  alleged	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  between	  the	  roles	  
of	  regulator	  and	  commercial	  entity.	  See	  Gyimah-­‐Boadi	  and	  Prempeh,	  “Oil,	  Politics,	  and	  Ghana’s	  
Democracy.”	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The impacts of civil society can also be seen elsewhere in the management of 
the oil sector. Specifically, high oil prices (spiking in 2008) inspired pressure from 
CSOs to lever government to include capital gains tax in agreements with the 
Amni International Petroleum Development Company and CAMAC Energy 
Incorporated.41  
Notable in this account of the extractive sector in Ghana is the difference 
between the mining and the oil and gas sectors, with the latter having far greater 
provisions for transparency and (at least on paper) accountability. The 
differences between the oil and gas sector are explained in the following quote 
from an interviewee: 
There is much more public consciousness in the petroleum sector than the 
mining sector. Therefore, there are much more corrective activities in 
petroleum than in mining, so they are not the same. Two things: One is that 
the hard mineral sector is older, established, and therefore we are trying to 
correct what it is. But the petroleum was new, so the CSO pressure came in 
at the beginning, and we actually got legislation powers which were partly 
domestic pressure, but also international practice. So now there are laws in 
place in the petroleum sector to monitor.42 
It is worth noting that the influence of civil society has not always been as 
effective in Ghana as it is today. For example, there were cross-party efforts to 
increase  the accountability of the extractive sector at the time of the drafting of 
the 1992 constitution. Here, a configuration of interests advised that all extractive 
industry agreements be subject, as early as possible, to a Public Agreements 
Review Committee, which would be an interministerial committee providing 
reviews and oversight prior to Cabinet finalization and parliamentary ratification. 
However, the suggestion did not have sufficient executive branch support at the 
time, and it was subsequently dropped.43 The result, today, is that by the time 
extractive contracts get to Parliament, it is too late to make changes—
notwithstanding the fact that Parliament itself is not the ideal plenum for debating 
the technicalities of such agreements. Thus, a relatively high level of 
discretionary power continues today, in part a consequence of the executive 
branch’s unwillingness to curtail its own discretionary powers. 
With a sense of both the laws governing extractive industries and the factors that 
shaped those laws, a necessary next step is an attempt to understand the extent 
to which those laws are followed (or not). The next section turns to an 
                                                
41	  Extractive	  industries	  (EI)	  expert,	  member	  of	  mining	  review	  commission,	  interview,	  January	  18,	  
2015.	  
42	  EI	  expert,	  member	  of	  mining	  review	  commission,	  interview.	  	  
43	  Asante,	  interview.	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examination of the specific oversight bodies created with the aim of ensuring 
accountability in the extractive sector.  
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVENUE SHARING 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), created in 2002 with 
financial and technical assistance from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and 
the World Bank Group, is often described as an important accountability 
mechanism. More accurately, however, it is a reconciliation body that seeks to 
marry government and company oil production and revenue figures and to 
identify discrepancies.44 Ghana committed to join the EITI in 2003, became a 
candidate in 2007 and was designated compliant in 2010. Ghana EITI (GEITI) is 
voluntary  and has a 23-member steering committee chaired by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, with representatives from three CSOs, two 
mining companies, two businesses, local government, and an assortment of 
Ghanaian ministries, departments, and agencies.  
In practice, GEITI has been successful in bringing attention to discrepancies 
between production and revenue data produced by government, on the one side, 
and PIAC and GEITI, on the other.45 It has also generated guidelines regarding 
the share of mining royalties that are distributed to local governments. Finally, 
GEITI has had success in documenting that even in cases where corporate 
payments and government revenues match, it remains difficult to assess whether 
the lowest-level tiers of recipient institutions, such as traditional institutions, 
actually receive what is duly theirs.  
PIAC, created in 2011 by the Petroleum Revenue Management Act as a 
response to pressure from civil society, has the tasks of ensuring compliance 
with the PRMA through (1) monitoring and evaluation, (2) providing space, as 
well as a platform for public debate, and (3) providing independent assessments 
on the management of petroleum revenues to the legislative and the executive 
branches of government. Despite the institutional weaknesses of PIAC, 
discussed in more detail below, it is worth noting that the institution has achieved 
some modest successes, even when working under difficult circumstances. 
These successes include the Salt Pond Oil Field being initially left out of revenue 
                                                
44	  Akabzaa	  and	  Ayamdoo	  in	  Towards	  a	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Taxation	  for	  Sustainable	  Development,	  
57,	  define	  EITI	  as	  an	  accountability	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  the	  	  Africa	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  for	  Energy	  Policy	  (ACEP),	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  African	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  tank	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  on	  mineral	  policy	  sees	  EITI	  as	  an	  institution	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  to	  recognize	  quantitative	  divergences.	  The	  different	  understandings	  of	  EITI	  reveal	  
misconceptions	  about	  the	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  of	  EITI	  as	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  of	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45	  For	  example,	  GEITI	  highlighted	  divergences	  in	  reported	  crude	  oil	  lifting,	  Jubilee	  field	  royalties,	  
carried	  and	  participating	  interest,	  the	  Annual	  Budget	  Funding	  Amount	  (ABFA),	  the	  Ghana	  
National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	  (GNPC),	  and	  the	  Ghana	  Stabilization	  Fund.	  ACEP,	  Three	  Years	  of	  
Petroleum	  Management	  in	  Ghana,	  45.	  	  
Oxfam America | The Weak Link: The Role of Local Institutions in Accountable Resource Management, Ghana 28 
reporting until PIAC identified the omission. PIAC’s reports have also been 
circulated widely and spurred public discussion—including on the issue of how 
revenues are spent.  
Despite these successes, problems persist in the management of the extractives 
sector. First, contract disclosure is not mandatory.46 In addition, there is little 
oversight of agreements over mineral rights that are produced by technocrats for 
approval by the minister and subsequently Cabinet. Notably, such agreements 
are only subject to review by Parliament after it is too late to amend them.  
In the case of the petroleum sector, contracts are initiated by the Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). There is no practice of open tendering or bidding 
for licenses, and contracts are awarded through closed administrative processes. 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law (PNDC Law 84) does provide 
for copies of applications for petroleum agreements to be forwarded to a public 
agreements board.47 However, the board was never made operational, and with 
the passing of the Petroleum Commission Act of 2011, the Petroleum 
Commission was given the responsibility to evaluate applications and petroleum 
agreements and to advise the Minister for Energy and Petroleum—rendering the 
role of the board null. 
Concerns about undisclosed contracts are exacerbated by apparent conflicts of 
interest in the extractives sector. For example, members of Parliament sit on the 
boards of mining companies,48 raising questions about companies’ influence over 
government decisions related to mining, the rationale and formulation of 
particular agreements, and the role of politicians as owners, regulators, or 
investors in extractive industries. 
Although there are legal provisions for allocating mining revenues to the local 
level, and although traditional authorities and institutions may receive various 
forms of revenue from mining, in practice royalties are not distributed to 
producing areas but held by government for redistribution through the 
Consolidated Fund. The system of auditing at this level is described as “weak or 
nonexistent.ˮ49 Consequently, the formal reporting obligations of stools and 
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  Mining	  contracts	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  confidential;	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  governments	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  oil	  
companies	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  more	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47	  Section	  2(3)	  for	  example,	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  an	  application	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applicant	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  National	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  be	  affected	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  Public	  
Agreements	  Board	  and	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48	  Ayee,	  Søreide,	  Shukla,	  and	  Le,	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Mining	  Sector	  in	  Ghana.	  
49	  Ayee,	  Søreide,	  Shukla,	  and	  Le,	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Mining	  Sector	  in	  Ghana,	  18.	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traditional councils concerning the use of mining revenue and its distribution from 
the Office of the Administrator for Stool Lands is unclear.50  
Uncertainty about royalty payments to the local level also affects accountability. 
Payments are justified more in terms of custom than legal right. This means 
chiefs do not have formal rights they can enforce to  to receive the relevant 
transfers, and further, they have little way of knowing how much they are entitled 
to or if a received amount is correct. Similarly, there is no legislation that dictates 
usage of the 10 percent royalties directed to the Mining Development Fund—
which is intended to counter destructive environmental impacts.51 
Regarding EITI, observers differ as to whether GEITI has actually impacted 
positively on the level of transparency related to oil revenue flows or not.52 
Generally, most observers (including GEITI) recognize that significant, sector-
wide institutional and structural challenges stand in the way of improving on the 
accountability of the extractive industries sector.53 Concerning audits, there are 
challenges in:  
! Assessing gold companies’ daily bullion revenue because of changing 
spot prices and different sales contracts 
! Evaluating the prices of particular minerals (for example, bauxite, 
diamonds, and manganese) as there are no established practices for 
making such evaluations available 
! Obtaining an overview of hedged transactions owing to sector 
disinclination in revealing trade practices54  
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  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Taxation	  for	  Sustainable	  Development,	  
57.	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Moreover, as a voluntary, goodwill initiative, GEITI lacks powers of enforcement 
or prosecution, and therefore cannot enforce sanctions. As a final frustration, all 
of the annual reports of GEITI have been delayed in their production.  
Act 815 (which determines allocations of oil revenues) is also thought to have 
weaknesses with the Minister of Finance enjoying too much leeway in deciding 
allocations to the different funds. Critics point out that the 12 priority areas, which 
are meant to guide the Annual Budget Funding Amount allocations, are too broad 
because almost any spending can be interpreted as coming under one area or 
another.55 Despite the broadness of these categories, however, ministerial 
discretion has meant significant allocations have been outside the defined priority 
areas, for example, oil and gas revenues that are meant for the budget being 
consistently allocated to the ends of capitalizing the Ghana National Gas 
Company, in alleged contravention of Act 815. In addition, the Minister of 
Finance has, at times, placed a cap on revenue flows to the Stabilization Fund, 
which in turn redirects money to the Contingency Fund56 instead, and which is 
not covered by the PRMA. From the Constitution (Article 177): 
(1) There shall be paid into the Contingency Fund moneys voted for the 
purpose by Parliament; and advances may be made from that Fund which 
are authorised by the committee responsible for financial measures in 
Parliament whenever that committee is satisfied that there has arisen an 
urgent or unforeseen need for expenditure for which no other provision exists 
to meet the need.  
(2) Where an advance is made from the Contingency Fund a supplementary 
estimate shall be presented as soon as possible to Parliament for the 
purpose of replacing the amount so advanced. 
Opponents highlight that the practice of cap setting is not regulated and is 
“arbitrary,ˮ being set by the minister responsible for finance (Article 23(3)) -  
allowing increased government spending and/or the redirection of revenue to 
debt service (in the form of the Sinking Fund – created in 2015 (Figure 1, page 
2). While these are technically legal transfers by the Minister of Finance to 
nonpriority areas as defined in Act 815, they are reportedly difficult to account for 
                                                
55	  Recommendations	  in	  this	  respect	  advocate	  for	  narrowing	  the	  focus	  to	  two	  specific	  areas	  of	  
concern—agriculture	  and	  education—to	  make	  better	  use	  of	  ABFA	  revenue.	  See	  “Review	  of	  the	  
Petroleum	  Revenue	  Management	  Act	  2011	  (Act	  815):	  Proposals	  Presented	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Finance	  and	  Economic	  Planning	  by	  the	  Africa	  Centre	  for	  Energy	  Policy	  (ACEP),	  the	  Center	  for	  
Public	  Interest	  Law	  (CEPIL)	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Nation	  (FoN)”	  (2013),	  
http://www.aceplive.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2013/12/ATT00051.pdf.	  
56	  This	  provision	  persists	  as	  Section	  23(4)	  of	  Act	  815,	  despite	  amendments	  implemented	  after	  this	  
research	  had	  been	  completed.	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and against the spirit of Act 815.57 Similarly, opponents highlight that the Minster 
of Finance’s “arbitrary” (re)allocation of revenues amounts to systematic 
contraventions of the discretionary powers of the Minster of Finance as 
constitutionally defined (Article 296).58  
Likewise, the governance of extractive industry revenue has experienced several 
cases of conflicting interpretations of the provision defining the terms of the 70-
to-30 split between the Annual Budget Funding Amount and the Petroleum 
Funds, which in turn impacts on available allocations to the priorities. For 
example, in 2013, nearly $70 million more was transferred from the Annual 
Budget Funding Amount (and consequently was not directed to the common 
fund), and was spent instead on debt service, than if the same interpretation of 
the provision and definition of “excessˮ that was used in 2012, was applied again 
in 2013. The allocation was passed by Parliament, and it demonstrated the ability 
of the executive branch to use discretionary power to interpret revenue flows to 
pursue particular agendas (in this case, servicing high-interest debt). A member 
of the Act 815 review committee explained ministerial discretion and the moving 
around of revenue as follows: 
I was a member of the committee set up to review the proposals received by 
the government. I had so much confidence in what the committee was doing, 
but after it finished its work, it’s like the recommendations have been put 
aside, and the minister [of finance] is doing his own things. For instance, 
there were no discussions at any time in the committee that 25 percent of the 
ABFA should go to the Ghana Infrastructure Fund. There was no deal ever 
discussed, but that is one of the amendments the minister is now seeking 
[decided] by the minister of finance ... the attempt was to project to the people 
of Ghana that there is an inclusive process of seeking the review of the law 
while indeed it is a solitary process … 
When questioned on what he thought the motivations for this might be, he 
replied:  
My take is that the minster wants to take more of the money outside the strict 
transparency and accountability framework in order to have flexibility over its 
use. The transparency framework in the law is not the same [for the different 
funds] so if 25 percent of the ABFA goes there [to the Contingency Fund], it is 
governed by a different set of rules which do not have the same transparency 
framework as 815, and then the minister has leverage. ... [A]lso, our law, 815, 
provides for a ceiling on the Stabilization Fund, and the excess goes to the 
Contingency Fund or debt payment, so if the minister wants more money 
                                                
57	  “Review	  of	  the	  Petroleum	  Revenue	  Management	  Act	  2011	  (Act	  815):	  Proposals	  Presented	  to	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  Planning	  by	  the	  Africa	  Centre	  for	  Energy	  Policy	  (ACEP),	  the	  
Center	  for	  Public	  Interest	  Law	  (CEPIL)	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Nation	  (FoN).”	  	  
58	  ACEP,	  Three	  Years	  of	  Petroleum	  Management	  in	  Ghana,	  7.	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outside the legal framework he puts a lower ceiling, which directs money to 
places that are not subject to strict rules. … The Contingency Fund cannot be 
spent without parliamentary approval, and the finance committee in 
Parliament must always approve … but [the composition of the committee 
means] they are always on the side of the ruling party, so his wishes will be 
adhered [to]. … [I]t’s an attempt to move revenues from places that are very 
strong to systems that are more flexible.59 
Finally, ministerial discretion, provided for by arbitrary caps and excessively 
broad terms for prioritizing investment, is enhanced by contradictions in Act 815, 
which actually make explicit allowances for discretionary revenue management 
and savings decisions. For example, Section 49 of the PRMA (Act 815), 
subsection 1, states that the “management of petroleum revenue and savings 
shall always be carried out with the highest internationally accepted standards of 
transparency and good governance,” but is inconsistent with subsection 3, which, 
in the name of protecting the petroleum funds’ performance, grants ministerial 
discretion in making decisions that are not subject to public or judicial review, nor 
bound by any obligation for disclosure. 
Regarding PIAC’s specific weaknesses, it has suffered inefficiencies and is not 
strictly an independent body. In particular, until July 31, 2015, Act 815 made no 
provisions for its funding. This problem was addressed through amendments to 
the PRMA, which took place in 2015, after research for this report had been 
completed. Under the amended law, PIAC is to submit a budget to the Minister 
responsible for Finance, for inclusion in the national budget. Notably, while the 
resourcing is now meant to come out of the Annual Budget Funding Amount, the 
actual allowances for PIAC’s members remain the discretion of the minister.60 It 
is yet to be seen whether this change will be significant for PIAC’s resourcing or 
performance.  
Other than resource constraints, PIAC has, since its inception, had to rely heavily 
on government-produced data,61 which means that it cannot follow its mandate to 
                                                
59	  Mohammed	  Amin	  Adam,	  executive	  director,	  ACEP,	  interview,	  April	  9,	  2015.	  
60	  See	  Amendment	  13	  of	  the	  Petroleum	  Revenue	  Management	  (Amendment)	  Act,	  2015	  (Act	  
893).	  	  
61	  PIAC	  comprises	  13	  	  members	  appointed	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  (1)	  a	  representative	  from	  an	  
“independent	  policy	  research	  think	  tank,”	  (2)	  “a	  member	  to	  represent	  civil	  society,”	  and	  (3)	  “a	  
member	  each	  nominated	  by	  the	  (i)	  Trade	  Union	  Congress,	  (ii)	  National	  House	  of	  Chiefs,	  (iii)	  
Association	  of	  Queen	  Mothers,	  (iv)	  Association	  of	  Ghana	  Industries	  and	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  
(v)	  Ghana	  Journalists	  Association,	  (vi)	  Ghana	  Bar	  Association,	  (vii)	  Institute	  of	  Chartered	  
Accountants,	  (viii)	  Ghana	  Extractive	  Industries	  Transparency	  Initiative;	  and	  (ix)	  Christian	  groups	  
namely	  the	  National	  Catholic	  Secretariat,	  the	  Christian	  Council	  and	  the	  Ghana	  Pentecostal	  
Council	  on	  a	  rotational	  basis,	  (x)	  the	  Federation	  of	  Muslim	  Councils	  and	  Ahmadiyya	  Mission	  on	  a	  
rotational	  basis,	  and	  (xi)	  Ghana	  Academy	  of	  Arts	  and	  Sciences.ˮ	  PRMA	  815,	  Section	  54	  The	  
principal	  enactment	  stated	  PIAC	  comprising	  ‘’eleven	  members	  including’’	  the	  above.	  This	  was	  
amended	  in	  2015	  to	  ‘’thirteen	  members	  comprising’’	  the	  above.	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undertake an “independent assessment” to make the process of revenue use 
accountable. The current chairman of PIAC, Major Daniel Sowa Ablorh-Quarcoo, 
has, since PIAC’s foundation, publicly lamented the lack of sufficient funds for the 
institution to fulfill its responsibilities.62 Recognized challenges of PIAC include 
the following: 
! It has an ill-defined role as a voluntary, advisory institution to the 
executive branch and Parliament 
! It is unable to demand information from the extractive industry sector 
! There is a lack of parliamentary debate and/or interest in PIAC reports.  
! It has a wide range of responsibilities that outstrip its level of 
resources63—the impact of amendments which change the way it is 
funded have yet to be determined 
! Key actors of PIAC, the MFEP, and the Bank of Ghana do not have to 
disclose conflicts of interest64 
! Government of Ghana practices include inadequate reporting and/or 
underreporting of quantitative data, which makes reconciliation with other 
sources difficult65 
! There are conflicting interpretations of subsections of extractive industry 
laws66 
! There are difficulties in forecasting67 production68 
                                                
62	  See,	  for	  example,	  Emmanuel	  K.	  Dogbevi,	  “PIAC	  Got	  No	  Office,	  No	  Letterheads,	  No	  Money	  from	  
Government,”	  Ghana	  Business	  News,	  May	  18,	  2012,	  http://www.spyghana.com/piac-­‐got-­‐no-­‐
office-­‐no-­‐letterheads-­‐no-­‐money-­‐from-­‐government/.	  
63	  The	  committee	  is	  required,	  among	  other	  responsibilities,	  to	  consult	  widely	  with	  citizens,	  have	  
its	  own	  secretariat,	  publish	  semiannual	  and	  annual	  reports	  in	  newspapers,	  publish	  its	  reports	  on	  
its	  website,	  hold	  public	  meetings	  twice	  a	  year,	  and	  submit	  its	  reports	  to	  the	  president	  and	  
Parliament.	  PRMA	  815,	  Section	  56.	  
64	  Concerning	  conflicts	  of	  interest,	  the	  act	  only	  addresses	  members	  themselves	  and	  not	  family	  or	  
business	  relations.	  See	  also	  ACEP/Adam,	  Amewu,	  Abanga,	  Boakye,	  and	  Salifu,	  How	  a	  Good	  Law	  
May	  Not	  Stop	  Oil	  Money	  from	  Going	  Down	  the	  Drain;	  {{This	  format,	  assuming	  second	  reference	  
to	  this	  report.	  (First	  reference	  is	  FN46?}}	  and	  ACEP,	  CEPIL,	  FoN,	  “Review	  of	  the	  Petroleum	  
Management	  Act	  of	  2011:	  Proposals	  Presented	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  
Planning,”	  http://www.aceplive.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2013/12/).pdf.	  	  
65	  There	  is	  an	  incentive	  for	  underreporting	  as	  “data	  on	  annual	  stocks	  and	  spill-­‐over	  barrels	  do	  not	  
affect	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  benchmark	  revenue,	  nor	  is	  it	  considered	  in	  crude	  oil	  accounting.ˮ	  
ACEP/Adam,	  Amewu,	  Abanga,	  Boakye,	  and	  Salifu,	  How	  a	  Good	  Law	  May	  Not	  Stop	  Oil	  Money	  from	  
Going	  Down	  the	  Drain,	  iv.	  
66	  For	  example,	  the	  Petroleum	  Income	  Tax	  Law,	  1987	  (PNDC	  Law	  188),	  and	  the	  Petroleum	  
Agreement	  both	  prohibit	  capital	  gains	  tax.	  This	  prohibition	  contrasts	  with	  Section	  95(1)	  of	  the	  
Internal	  Revenue	  Act,	  2000	  (Act	  592),	  that	  fixes	  capital	  gains	  tax	  at	  10	  percent	  and	  stipulates	  that	  
in	  cases	  of	  conflict	  with	  other	  agreements,	  it	  is	  Act	  815	  that	  should	  prevail	  (Section	  1[2]).	  
67	  Amendments	  to	  the	  act,	  passed	  after	  this	  research	  was	  complete,	  have	  made	  allowances	  for	  
revisions	  of	  forecast	  in	  cases	  where	  oil	  prices	  change.	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! It is difficult to comprehend the process of parliamentary approval of the 
government of Ghana’s petroleum revenue budgets 
! There are contradictions between Act 815 itself and agreements between 
the government of Ghana and international oil companies (IOCs)69  
! PIAC is unable to collect its own data70 
 
The result is that PIAC is not called upon to provide reports to either Parliament 
or to the executive branch, and neither political party has been known to use its 
reports.  
Despite the broad criticisms of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act and the 
weaknesses of PIAC, some experts point to the act as evidence that civil society 
platforms can influence extractive industry lawmaking for the better.71 Indeed, 
there are suggestions that the incumbent National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
government is in favor of strengthening PIAC with legislation enabling it to 
demand data from the sector.72 Still, on this point, the current chairman of PIAC 
remained hesitant about whether he thought PIAC would gain greater legal 
powers. 
Potential reasons for skepticism include the fact that there is little solid evidence 
of the discretionary powers of the Minister of Finance being used to strengthen 
accountability mechanisms. On the contrary, the experiences of the Act 815 
review committee members point to ministerial unwillingness to make 
amendments that seriously improve oversight institutions. For example, looking 
at some of the other gestures made toward accountability in extractive industry-
related statute, tribunals, as provided for in Act 654 in 2003, are not yet 
established, and, almost across the country, plans for ministry, department, and 
agency audit report implementation committees are either nonexistent or 
dysfunctional. One informant explained:  
[E]ven the ministries, departments, and agencies that do have [audit report 
committees]—they are being asked to implement recommendations against 
themselves, and so what is the incentive for the committees to be efficient 
                                                                                                                                
68	  ACEP/Adam,	  Amewu,	  Abanga,	  Boakye,	  and	  Salifu,	  How	  a	  Good	  Law	  May	  Not	  Stop	  Oil	  Money	  
from	  Going	  Down	  the	  Drain,	  2.	  	  
69	  As	  an	  example,	  Act	  815	  	  defines	  the	  payment	  of	  capital	  gains	  tax	  from	  sales	  of	  “ownership	  of	  
exploration,	  development	  and	  production	  rights.”	  This	  however	  appears	  contradictory	  to	  the	  
negotiated	  terms	  in	  the	  current	  Jubilee	  contracts	  which	  prohibit	  capital	  gain	  tax.	  	  ACEP/Adam,	  
Amewu,	  Abanga,	  Boakye,	  and	  Salifu,	  How	  a	  Good	  Law	  May	  Not	  Stop	  Oil	  Money	  from	  Going	  Down	  
the	  Drain,	  5.	  	  
70	  In	  contrast	  to	  these	  weaknesses,	  a	  current	  minister	  and	  former	  member	  of	  PIAC	  said	  that	  he	  
had	  never	  experienced	  any	  problems	  with	  members’	  conflicts	  of	  interest,	  obtaining	  data,	  or	  
apparent	  contradictions	  between	  EI	  law	  and	  practice.	  Interview,	  December	  19,	  2014.	  	  
71	  Gyimah-­‐Boadi	  and	  Prempeh,	  “Oil,	  Politics,	  and	  Ghana’s	  Democracy.”	  
72	  Dogbe,	  Follow	  the	  Money,	  18.	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and functional? So those that have [committees] are not functional, but a lot 
of ministries do not even have [committees], and so the institutions and the 
structures that are supposed to act on the recommendations of PIAC do not 
provide sufficient grounds for the committees’ work to be taken on board, and 
so, they may hold public hearings … but they can only recommend.73 
Considering all of the above and reflecting on what drives decision-making 
around revenue sharing and extractive industries, it is clearly difficult to unravel 
the exact internal dynamics of the bureaucracies that produce unfavorable 
agreements for the country, particularly because the process of making 
agreements remains largely shrouded in secrecy, given a culture of 
nondisclosure and confidentiality clauses in the name of protecting business 
interests. Illustrative of the capricious forces that might drive these dynamics is 
the example of a former senior advisor to a minister of finance who was livid 
upon learning that the minister of lands and natural resources at that time had 
signed a lenient mining agreement.74 
This brief insight reveals a relatively high level of ministerial autonomy, a lack of 
oversight, and a lack of checks and balances—all within a large and fragmented 
system of decision-making. Leniency is evident in extractive industry–related law 
that allows for multiple interpretations and a high level of ministerial discretion, 
and it suggests a lawmaking rationale aimed at establishing a flexible legal 
framework that limits accountability and allows for nondisclosure. It is because of 
such discretionary powers that some agreements appear to trump the spirit of 
certain laws. The implication is that accountability is meted out in a closed 
informal system separate from the formal rules. In such an environment, the 
institutional incentives to improve ministerial and bureaucratic performance and 
accountability are diminished by the favors owed and given between potential 
decision-makers, as well as by the possibility of future gains from similar 
dealings. 
It seems clear then that many political, economic, and institutional factors 
influence the formulation of revenue-sharing agreements in Ghana. The list of 
numerous institutional and structural features that may be significant includes the 
degree of competition and current level of international interest in the commodity 
in question; the estimations and forecasts of the future value of the “findˮ; 
whether the find is similar in size and value to existing areas of exploration and 
production; the estimated costs to government; the level of experience and 
expertise of negotiators; whether commodity prices are buoyant, stable, or erratic 
at the time of negotiations; the broader global economic outlook; the domestic 
economic situation; the influence of vested interests among (government) 
representatives; the balance of power between negotiators; and the timing of 
                                                
73	  Amin	  Adam,	  interview.	  
74	  Former	  adviser,	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  interview,	  January	  11,	  2015.	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negotiations in relation to an election cycle.75 The result is that revenue-sharing 
agreements and contracts are not necessarily informed by existing laws; instead, 
they shape, and are shaped by, the incentives and capabilities of the wider 
political and economic decision-making environment, an environment constituted 
by both formal and informal rules, and by different interests, levels of knowledge, 
and incentives.  
Clearly, a host of processes determine revenue-sharing agreements in Ghana. 
Notably, in terms of oil and gas revenues, the same legislation covering revenue 
collection also mandates how those revenues should be expended in the 
country. The next question is how the 80 percent of revenues that come from 
mining and go to the Consolidated Fund are allocated. For this examination, this 
research now turns to an exploration of the process by which the budget is 
formulated and executed. 
  
                                                
75	  Former	  minister,	  expert	  on	  EI	  issues,	  interview,	  January	  22,	  2015.	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4. BUDGET PROCESS 
AND REVENUE 
ALLOCATIONS IN 
GHANA 
 
This section of the report examines how the budget process is meant to work, the 
formal institutions of oversight designed to ensure that it works properly, and the 
failings in the process. As in the preceding section, this one looks at what is 
meant to happen and what actually happens. 
In an ideal situation, the national budget would be based on firm knowledge 
about the amount of revenue available. An important feature of many developing 
country budgets, however, is that such knowledge is not possible. In these 
countries, budgets are generally compromised by both limited information and a 
limited ability to forecast and project revenue flows. Thus, Ghana’s national 
budgets are a kind of snapshot of known and expected revenue at a given time, 
which normally changes through the fiscal year.76 Significantly, the implications 
are that the process of national budget making “is not based on any fiscal rules” 
that could otherwise define, for example, GDP-to-debt ratios, balance of 
payments deficits, or growth margins.77  
The timeline for budget formulation in Ghana satisfies the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency.78 Notably, however, the country fares relatively poorly on the 
                                                
76	  Ghana’s	  fiscal	  year	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  calendar	  year.	  
77	  Kwakye,	  J.K.,	  and	  Nkechi	  Owoo.	  Righting	  the	  Ills	  of	  Budget	  Preparation,	  Implementation	  and	  
Oversight	  in	  Ghana.	  IEA	  Monograph	  39.	  Institute	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  (IEA),	  2014:22.	  
78	  This	  places	  Ghana	  seventh	  of	  26	  countries	  in	  timeline	  transparency.	  See	  Collaborative	  Africa	  
Budget	  Reform	  Initiative	  (CABRI)	  and	  African	  Development	  Bank	  (AfDB),	  Budget	  Practices	  and	  
Procedures	  in	  Africa	  2008	  (CABRI,	  2008),	  4,	  
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20ENG.
pdf.	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Open Budget Index.79 Budget making, planning, and formulation are meant to be 
defined and guided by Ghana’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(introduced in 1999 as an element of the country’s Public Financial Management 
Reform Program, or PUFMARP).80 The rationale of the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework was to shift the budget from an input-driven process 
(based mainly on the availability of revenue) to an output-driven process (based 
on desired goals and outcomes) in which greater autonomy is handed to 
ministries, departments, and agencies. This shift was also meant to establish 
budget ownership and responsibility over planning and to improve accountability 
and transparency.81 The Medium Term Expenditure Framework enables the 
current annual budget to be tied to rolling budgets over coming years in 
accordance with a national development strategy.  
The terms by which resources are financially managed, and the roles of the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government in this process are 
stipulated in the 1992 Constitution, Articles 174–189. The budget has a 
hierarchical structure, whereby the Cabinet is empowered to create and impose 
ceilings “for all types of expenditure at a line item level.”82 The Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework considers the sectors that define three-year ministerial 
objectives covering: (1) infrastructure, (2) administration, (3) social, economic, 
and governance, and (4) public safety.83  
The process for developing the budget proceeds as follows: First, the MFEP 
defines the resource envelope along with macroeconomic and sector objectives. 
Next, priorities with mission statements and cost projections are made by 
ministerial budget committees, guided by the MFEP’s defined ceilings. Revenues 
and expenditure ceilings are usually based on the previous year’s allocation and 
spending, investment priorities, particular executive priorities, and the need to 
                                                
79	  Ghana	  is	  identified	  as	  only	  providing	  “some”	  budget	  information	  in	  2010	  and	  2012,	  with	  
‘“insufficient”	  reporting	  in	  2015	  “Open	  Budget	  Index	  Rankings,”	  International	  Budget	  
Partnership,	  2015	  http://internationalbudget.org/opening-­‐budgets/open-­‐budget-­‐initiative/open-­‐
budget-­‐survey/publications-­‐2/rankings-­‐key-­‐findings/rankings/.	  
80	  The	  objective	  of	  PUFMARP	  is	  to	  stabilize	  fiscal	  policy	  and	  improve	  service	  delivery	  with	  the	  
allocation	  of	  resources	  to	  strategic	  priority	  areas.	  See	  Samuel	  Nana	  Yaw	  Simpson,	  “Developments	  
in	  Public	  Sector	  Accounting	  Practice:	  The	  Ghanaian	  Experience,”	  in	  Accounting	  in	  Africa,	  ed.	  
Venancio	  Tauringana	  and	  Musa	  Mangena	  (Emerald	  Group	  Publishing,	  2012),	  214.	  
81	  Eboe	  Hutchful,	  “Ghana,”	  in	  Budgeting	  for	  the	  Military	  Sector	  in	  Africa:	  The	  Processes	  and	  
Mechanisms	  of	  Control,	  ed.	  Wuyi	  Omitoogun	  and	  Eboe	  Hutchful	  (Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  
Research	  Institute,	  2006),	  91.	  
82	  Wuyi	  Omitoogun,	  “Introduction,”	  in	  Budgeting	  for	  the	  Military	  Sector	  in	  Africa:	  The	  Processes	  
and	  Mechanisms	  of	  Control,	  ed.	  Wuyi	  Omitoogun	  and	  Eboe	  Hutchful	  (Stockholm	  International	  
Peace	  Research	  Institute,	  2006),	  7.	  
83	  Hutchful,	  “Ghana,”	  79.	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ensure that recurrent costs are covered.84 Ministries, departments, and agencies 
review their budgets, strategic plans, outcomes, and costs, and their priorities are 
presented to the MFEP, with estimates within the guideline ceilings. These 
priorities are subject to budget hearings in which estimates may be revised. 
Budget hearings aim to ensure estimates are within ceilings and consistent with 
plans. Sector ministries then prepare their budgets based on budget guidelines 
and MFEP ceilings, and review their own medium-term policy and expenditure 
priorities. Their three-year expenditure budget is then passed to the MFEP, which 
formulates the consolidated budget.85 Estimates are subsequently approved and 
submitted to Cabinet and then to Parliament for further approval. After the budget 
has been approved, the Ministry of Finance releases funds to ministries, 
departments, and agencies through the Controller and Accountant General’s 
Department (CAGD).86 
In reviewing the budget, the legislature cannot “increase existing items nor create 
new ones” and can only “decrease existing expenditures/revenues.”87 Any 
unallocated money cannot be reallocated by the executive branch. If the 
legislature fails to approve the budget before the commencement of the fiscal 
year, it votes on interim measures. Supplementary appropriations are necessary 
as new projections of revenue, unanticipated expenditures, and new knowledge 
about macroeconomic performance come to light through the year after the 
budget has been passed. Supplementary appropriations, approved by 
Parliament, give the government legal protection for (further) spending. Actual 
revenues and expenditures are published and made publicly available every six 
months.88 With conditions, ministers can reallocate funds “between line items 
within their responsibility.”89 
CONTROLLING THE EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET 
A central institution concerned with ensuring accountability over the budget 
process is, of course, the legislature, which has to pass the budget after it has 
been debated. Other important mechanisms of accountability include the reports 
of the auditor general from the Ghana Audit Service, which is constitutionally 
                                                
84	  Michael	  Johnson,	  “Understanding	  the	  Real	  Budget	  Process:	  The	  Case	  of	  Ghana,”	  Ghana	  
Strategy	  Support	  Program/Discussion	  Note	  29	  (International	  Food	  Policy	  Research	  Institute	  
[IFPRI],	  2013).	  	  
85	  Hutchful,	  “Ghana,”	  81.	  
86	  J.K.	  Kwakye	  and	  Nkechi	  Owoo,	  Righting	  the	  Ills	  of	  Budget	  Preparation,	  Implementation	  and	  
Oversight	  in	  Ghana,	  IEA	  Monograph	  39	  (Institute	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  [IEA],	  2014),	  4.	  
87	  CABRI	  and	  AfDB,	  Budget	  Practices	  and	  Procedures	  in	  Africa,	  12.	  
88	  Ayee,	  Søreide,	  Shukla,	  and	  Le,	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Mining	  Sector	  in	  Ghana.	  
89	  CABRI	  and	  AfDB,	  Budget	  Practices	  and	  Procedures	  in	  Africa,	  17.	  The	  conditions	  themselves	  are	  
not	  explained	  in	  the	  CABRI-­‐AfDB	  report.	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mandated under Article 187(2), and the Controller and Accountant General’s 
Department. The former produces bulky reports to Parliament and the 
parliamentary Public Accounts Committee. The Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act (Act 815) did not take away the obligation of the auditor general 
to audit and report on petroleum revenues. The auditor general therefore has to 
audit the petroleum revenues as part of an annual examination of all revenues 
accruing to government. 
A key role of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is to hold public hearings, 
call in and question public servants, and report to Parliament. The Public 
Accounts Committee reviews the financial transactions based on the auditor 
general’s report to Parliament and can make recommendations to iron out any 
irregularities, including the retrieval of funds, legal action, and sanction - which 
are tabled on the floor of the legislature for deliberation and acceptance, and 
which will figure in a Public Accounts Committee report. The Controller and 
Accountant General’s Department is more of an ex post accountability institution 
that is supposed to only allow payments to ministries, departments, and agencies 
after expenditure is verified and the availability of revenue is checked.  
The role of parliamentary committees is to provide oversight of ministerial and 
government activities, and, more generally, to research, investigate, and provide 
a platform for public participation. Standing committees are concerned with the 
governing of the legislature, and select committees monitor the role of 
ministries.90 Members of Parliament have to apply for committee positions and 
are appointed to between one and three committees. The leadership of the 
majority party appoints most committee leaders, and these leaders tend to be 
from the majority party. That said, the Public Accounts Committee and the 
Committee on Subsidiary Legislation chairmanships are reserved for the minority 
party members, and their committee leaders are appointed by the minority party.  
Appointment to various committees is based on factors such as standing in 
public life, expertise, and political experience. Party leaders often forward 
suitable candidates to the Parliamentary Select Committee and the House. The 
process of appointment as well as the constitution of committees is guided by the 
constitution itself following “standing orders of Parliament, regional balance, party 
unity, and compromise between the majority and minority party.”91 
                                                
90	  Robert	  I.	  Rotberg	  and	  Jennifer	  E.	  Salahub,	  African	  Legislative	  Effectiveness,	  Research	  Report	  
(North–South	  Institute	  [NSI],	  2013),	  http://www.nsi-­‐ins.ca/wp-­‐content/uploads/2013/10/2013-­‐
African-­‐Legislative-­‐Effectiveness1.pdf.	  
91	  Rick	  Stapenhurst	  and	  Riccardo	  Pelizzo,	  “Improving	  Democracy	  and	  Accountability	  in	  Ghana:	  
The	  Importance	  of	  Parliamentary	  Oversight	  Tools,”	  Governance:	  An	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Policy,	  Administration,	  and	  Institutions	  25,	  no.	  2	  (2012):	  335–46.  
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FAILINGS IN THE BUDGET PROCESS 
Despite the provisions described above, the budget process suffers from 
numerous problems, and the administration and execution of the budget 
frequently fails to follow formal guidelines. A major problem is that a substantial 
portion of revenue comes in during the second half of the year, when donor funds 
are made available. The result is delays in the release of funding,92 which impact 
negatively on planning and cause problems for sectors in which production is 
seasonally sensitive (e.g., agriculture). Delays (envisaged or otherwise) 
complicate the tracking of expenditure to its final destination and derail 
performance and effectiveness targets. The level of effectiveness in budget 
execution is influenced by the extent to which sufficient resources are allocated, 
which in turn influences the quality of program and policy implementation. From 
the literature, it appears that more emphasis has been placed on affecting budget 
allocations than in ensuring the quality of budget execution.  
Budget administration has, until recently, employed an activity-based budgeting 
system introduced by international financial institutions in 1998. The system 
focuses on reporting and monitoring disbursements rather than on providing 
indicators to ensure the quality of service provision.93 From 2014, Ghana was 
poised to use a program-based budgeting (PBB) system to replace the activity-
based system. The aim was to improve accountability by connecting the flow of 
resources to outputs in the form of fulfilling specific policy objectives. It is too 
early to evaluate the success of PBB in Ghana, but reports from Mozambique, 
where the approach has been introduced, point to PBB not being able to identify 
what exactly money has been spent on, only that it has been spent.94 
Uncertainty and debate over data and projections mean that the calculations over 
these figures become part of the political game. Most notably, this uncertainty 
has resulted in budget formulations based on systematic underestimation of 
salaries and overestimation on all other expenses.95 CDD-Ghana reports that the 
situation reflects salary budgets being left as estimates “subject to final decisions 
on salary increases and on staff numbers.ˮ This practice provides flexibility and 
results in contingency budgets that are made to cover the anticipated cost of 
adjustments. Meanwhile, any underestimates demand that the MFEP has to find 
                                                
92	  Johnson,	  “Understanding	  the	  Real	  Budget	  Process.”	  
93	  Johnson,	  “Understanding	  the	  Real	  Budget	  Process.”	  
94	  Johnson,	  “Understanding	  the	  Real	  Budget	  Process.”.	  	  
95	  Killick,	  Tony.	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Ghana’s	  Budgetary	  System.”	  CDD/ODI	  Policy	  Brief	  No.	  2.	  Ghana	  
Center	  for	  Democratic	  Development	  (CDD),	  2005.	  http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-­‐
assets/publications-­‐opinion-­‐files/1963.pdf.	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“funding for the (unbudgeted) difference from either non-salary recurrent budgets 
or from development expenditures.ˮ96 Notably, the issue of a wage bill has been a 
concern in Ghana for some time. Some changes were introduced in 2014, and 
the recent IMF negotiations97 have also sought to resolve this issue. It is currently 
too early to tell if these efforts have had any success in addressing these 
problems. 
For ministries, departments, and agencies, it is normal that the disbursement of 
their funds be delayed for numerous months owing to unforthcoming or 
unrealized revenue flows. These delays result in weak relationships between 
approved budgets and what money ends up being spent on, and they increase 
the likelihood of negative impacts on programs and projects. Furthermore, 
observers highlight that the necessity for supplementary budgets makes the 
process of planning and decision-making related to budget deficits difficult to 
follow, regardless of biannual publications of actual revenues and expenditures. 
In terms of parliamentary oversight, it is very rare for a budget not to be passed 
by the legislature, and it is broadly acknowledged that Parliament cannot 
satisfactorily fulfill its oversight functions as regards the budget. (More details on 
why this is the case are provided in Section 5.) In addition, MPs acting on 
standing and select committees can be influenced by the interests of government 
and suffer from resource and capacity issues—including a lack of expert staff 
with no parliamentary budget office. As a result, parliamentary committees 
appear to play an ambiguous role: On the one hand, their composition and 
functioning generates an idea of an inclusive  and cross-party parliamentary 
system of oversight in which all members are formally required to participate. On 
the other hand, committees are starved of sufficient resources, do not have the 
legal teeth to force through recommendations, and—owing to incentive problems 
(Section 6)—do not systematically act as a brake on the workings of the 
executive branch.  
Considering budget ceilings, some observers claim that the outcome of hearings 
can be significantly influenced by ruling party interests.98 The notion of an 
inclusive budget is also contested by accounts of rural-based district chief 
executives (DCEs) in the Northern Region, who indicated that the budget is 
                                                
96	  CDD-­‐Ghana	  (Andrew	  Lawson,	  Gyimah	  Boadi,	  Ato	  Ghartey,	  Adom	  Ghartey,	  Tony	  Killick,	  Zainab	  
Kizilbash	  Agha,	  Tim	  Williamson).	  Joint	  Evaluation	  of	  Multi-­‐Donor	  Budget	  Support	  to	  Ghana	  Based	  
on	  OECD-­‐DAC	  methodology;	  Final	  Report	  Volume	  One:	  Evaluation	  Results	  and	  Recommendations	  
on	  Future	  Design	  &	  Management	  of	  Ghana	  MDBS,	  Report	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  Ghana	  and	  to	  
the	  MDBS	  Partners.	  ODI	  (2007)	  pp	  149.	  http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-­‐
assets/publications-­‐opinion-­‐files/247.pdf 
97	  In	  February	  2015	  Ghana	  was	  in	  negotiations	  with	  the	  IMF,	  following	  the	  country’s	  request	  for	  
support	  to	  deal	  with	  its	  financial	  crisis.	  Parts	  of	  the	  bailout	  package	  included	  conditions	  for	  more	  
responsible	  spending	  and	  budget	  control.	  	  
98	  Sakyi,	  Azunu,	  and	  Mensah,	  “Legislator	  Views	  on	  Knowledge	  and	  Capacity	  Challenges,”	  9.	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made in Accra with little input from outer lying areas. Notably, while the formal 
budget process includes provisions for inputs from the regional budget into the 
national budget (in the form of the composite budget99), when rural-based DCEs 
were asked about their role in the budgetary process, they described how they 
are allocated travel and accommodation expenses, allowing them to travel to the 
northern capital of Tamale for regional coordinating meetings with the regional 
minister in order to be briefed about government policy. They described how they 
are not consulted on national budgetary issues and said that the gatherings are 
purely informative—as well as social and political (for party purposes).100 Asked 
about the role of MPs in the process of budget making, a Northern Region MP 
explained: 
Before they [the MFEP] come out with the budget to Parliament they would 
have taken them [other ministers] through all these formulas for them to 
accept in order to prepare it. We [MPs] will not be in the meetings because 
we are just in the legislation aspect of the government. We will not be 
previewed on what is going on... and are not involved. But when it comes to 
the floor of Parliament, we think [that] as members of Parliament we still need 
enough time, because the budget document is big and complicated. So we 
need time to be able to scrutinize it well, other than that we may gloss over 
certain things that we will not have time for. ... [S]ometimes we meet at the 
committee levels for the various sectorial budgets [where we look at] the 
overview of 2014 and the projections for 2015. [W]e look at all those things, 
but there is still not much time [and] we are not [always] able to get a ... 
technocrat ... to take us through, but at least we do our best, we are able to 
do about 60 to 70 percent.101  
This opinion is shared by most informants, who agreed that the making of the 
budget is a closed intragovernmental process from which civil society is 
excluded. Writing in 2005, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-
Ghana) states that civil society inputs are not institutionalized and that district 
assembly participation is curtailed because discussions are overwhelmingly 
based in ministries in Accra.102 Still, district assemblies are obligated to 
communicate revenue flows and expenditure to communities at public meetings. 
                                                
99	  The	  challenges	  and	  successes	  of	  the	  composite	  budget	  process	  (introduced	  in	  2012)	  are	  not	  
discussed	  in	  this	  work	  because	  the	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  of	  this	  research	  is	  on	  the	  national	  budget	  process.	  
However,	  in	  this	  regard,	  it	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  few	  sources	  that	  document	  the	  budget	  process	  
highlight	  the	  role	  of	  the	  composite	  budget	  in	  making	  any	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	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budget	  process.	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  District	  chief	  executive,	  Northern	  Region,	  interview,	  January	  9,	  2015.	  
101	  MP,	  interview,	  December	  15,	  2015.	  
102	  Killick,	  Tony.	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Ghana’s	  Budgetary	  System.”	  CDD/ODI	  Policy	  Brief	  No.	  2.	  Ghana	  
Center	  for	  Democratic	  Development	  (CDD),	  2005.	  http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-­‐
assets/publications-­‐opinion-­‐files/1963.pdf.	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Finally, oversight institutions are also characterized by numerous problems. 
Reports from auditors can experience significant delays, such as the Ghana 
Audit Service report for 2013 being released over a year late. Similarly, the 
functions of these institutions do not appear to be binding. For example, the 
Controller and Accountant General’s Department, whose job it is to ensure that 
payments to ministries, departments, and agencies only happen after 
expenditure is verified and the availability of revenue is checked, can be 
“breached through official interventions and unapproved payments.”103 
The introduction, in 2009, of the Ghana Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (GIFMIS)—an automated system for the processing of 
expenditure—was meant to resolve some of these issues by improving 
budgetary processes at the Controller and Accountant General’s Department, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the Public Services Commission.104 As yet, it is not 
possible to tell if GIFMIS has made a substantial impact on resolving these 
specific challenges.  
In theory, the Public Accounts Committee (which is responsible for reading the 
reports of the Ghana Audit Service, holding public hearings, calling in and 
questioning public servants, and reporting to Parliament) should be a central 
mechanism to hold government to account. In practice, however, its role is 
limited. It does not influence executive branch decision-making processes, its 
work can be restricted by party discipline to minor cases of maladministration, it 
has no power to prosecute, and, in cases of monitoring the flow of revenues, it is 
reliant on government-produced data.105 In all, despite often-convincing evidence 
demonstrated in reports of the Auditor General, the Public Accounts Committee 
has great difficulty in either retrieving misused funds or getting the political 
support needed to implement concrete recommendations for better 
administrative practice. 
Efforts at reforming the budget have had limited success. The Public Financial 
Management Reform Program (PUFMARP, mentioned earlier) has experienced 
slow progress across a number of its 10 elements, including computerization, 
improving expenditure and cash management practices, procurement reform, 
and fiscal decentralization. According to CDD-Ghana, the challenges are rooted 
in poor coordination, the reform package being far too ambitious, and the fact 
that PUFMARP is seen by implementers as externally driven and having a lack of 
                                                                                                                                	  
103	  Kwakye,	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domestic ownership.106 A 2012 donor-commissioned report concludes that there 
is a distinct dearth of political commitment and leadership and a loss of initial 
PUFMARP reform momentum.107  
As such, no clear rules divide responsibilities in the budget process. This 
ambiguity has meant that the process of budget making and planning may 
change from government to government, as seen by the changing role of the 
Planning Commission, which formally functions under the president, but which, in 
practice, according to critics, has been merged with the MFEP. The result is that 
project planning and guidance about budgeting that is forwarded to ministries, 
departments, and agencies is open to politicization. There is an overt focus on 
short-term planning agendas, where each new government formulates its own 
development plans that in due course are shunned by their successors.108 A key 
challenge is the refusal of successive governments to align their budgets to a 
predetermined Development Plan as envisaged in the Constitution and also in 
Section 21(2)(d) of Act 815, which directs that the “ABFA [Annual Budget 
Funding Amount] expenditure must be guided by a medium-term expenditure 
framework aligned with a long-term national development plan approved by 
Parliament.”  
Observers acknowledge the failings of reforms and of the above accountability 
mechanisms despite changes in public institutions brought about by GIFMIS. The 
budgetary process is still input driven (meaning it is based on what the MFEP 
thinks is available) and characterized by lack of discipline and ownership. This 
assessment is evidenced by the fact that since the ratification of the Financial 
Administration Act in 2003, no ministry, department, or agency has prepared 
annual financial statements, as is required by that act.109  
The result is that actual expenditures bear little resemblance to approved 
allocations, and most ministries either overshoot or underspend, with deficits 
carried on to the next year. Informants explained that any instances of 
overspending will appear in the end-of-the-year report of the auditor general, 
whose office will ask the Ministry of Finance and relevant institutions to explain 
the unfunded spending. In theory, the spending could have been approved by the 
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Controller and Accountant General’s Department, although by law it needs 
parliamentary endorsement before distribution.  
Any examples of overspending can also be discussed by the PAC, which can call 
in and question relevant actors. If agreed, the PAC will put forward a motion for a 
retrospective approval. The Audit Service Act (2000) calls for audit report 
implementation committees to ensure that any recommendations passed by 
Parliament (for example, for retrieval) are implemented by the respective 
ministry, department, or agency. Audit report implementation committees are 
also tasked with making their own reports to this effect. Finally, ministries, 
departments, and agencies are obliged to report on how any Public Accounts 
Committee recommendations that they might have received have been 
implemented. In practice, however, this chain of accountability functions very 
differently: Public Accounts Committee reports are invariably not deliberated on 
the floor, which means audit report implementation committees have no 
parliamentary-endorsed report to form a basis for their follow-up role. At the end 
of 2012 there had not been any audit report implementation committees 
established in any of the institutions. Meanwhile, ministries, departments, and 
agencies do not report back on what they have done to improve practices (and 
they are not levered to do so). Consequently, year after year, the recognized 
shortcomings of the financial management of public institutions addressed by the 
auditor general and Public Accounts Committee are not improved upon.110 
In addition to these problems, when assessing the effectiveness of accountability 
mechanisms in monitoring the budget process, it is relevant to recognize that a 
significant part of government expenditure is “off-budget,” including substantial 
expenditures such as “social security funds, loan guarantees, public sector 
pensions and donor funds,” which are not bound by budgetary rules.111 Off-
budget spending typically takes place when actual allocations fall short of 
expected allocations, leading to projects that have begun without a sufficient 
budget and that need supplementary funding. Off-budgeting can occur when 
grant and other money does not go through the central budget because agencies 
want to manage the fund themselves. It can also occur as a result of struggles 
between, on the one hand, a particular ministry, department, or agency, and, on 
the other, the MFEP, where the former commits itself to spending without the 
approval or knowledge of the latter, or when the decision of the latter is 
disregarded.  
A former senior adviser to the minister of finance remarked that the consequence 
of a ministry, department, or agency going against the minister of finance 
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depends on the latter’s influence (based on status, experience, political capital, 
etc.) and courage at the Cabinet level. Often, the money will be found to avoid 
court action by creditors. When ministries, departments, and agencies go against 
the minister of finance, the latter’s position is also weakened. This outcome 
reflects the current financial administration laws not having provisions for 
punishing ministries, departments, or agencies in the event of financial 
misconduct, and it may partly explain why reviews of the budget process are 
insufficient.112 Besides the legal framework not being favorable to the imposition 
of sanctions for maladministration, accountability mechanisms are also hindered 
by widespread capacity challenges. In the case of the Ghana Audit Service, for 
example, its ability to fulfill terms of reference are hackneyed by “limited funding 
and staffing, lack of logistics, infrastructure and human resource training,” all of 
which contribute to considerable, systematic backlogs.113 Based on the above, it 
would appear that the budget process in Ghana, despite having a clear 
description of its formulation and execution, and despite the existence of a host 
of accountability and reporting mechanisms, suffers from major deficiencies. The 
formulation of the budget does not appear to be driven by any “fiscal rules,” and 
monitoring of the expenditure side of the budget appears to be especially weak. 
In this context, a significant question for this research pertains to who is able to 
influence earmarking processes regarding petroleum revenues and who is able 
to shape budget priorities. The next section seeks to address this question.  
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5. INFLUENCING 
REVENUE 
ALLOCATIONS 
Considering all of the above, this research is ready to explore who determines 
budget expenditure and the allocation of natural resource revenues. Because 
mineral revenues in Ghana are allocated through the general budget, while oil 
revenues are legally allocated to funds with distinct governance requirements, 
the report considers sources of relative influence over both of these revenue 
flows.  
INFLUENCE OVER OIL REVENUES 
Regarding oil revenues and the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), the 
vagueness of the 12 priorities set forth in Act 815 (mentioned earlier) suggests 
that lawmakers have sought to appease all levels, sectors, and segments of 
society. Meanwhile, in the absence of a definitive prioritization or long-term 
development plan, the fact that almost any investment could reasonably be 
justified in some way as falling under one of the 12 priorities has maximized 
executive control over decision-making regarding oil revenues. As a result, the 
risk of ineffective use and distribution of resources is real. In the period 2011–
2013, and then maintained in 2014, the executive branch developed four priority 
areas: 
1. Expenditure and amortization of loans for oil and gas infrastructure 
2. Road and other infrastructure 
3. Agriculture modernization 
4. Capacity building (including oil and gas)114 
It’s clear that an overriding priority has been in the direction of national 
industrialization in order to diversify the economy. Breaking down infrastructure 
spending, however, it is noticeable that the Office of the President (which covers 
a number of central state positions and institutions) was allocated 11 percent of 
the ABFA, with 4 percent for recurrent spending, which was more than the 
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amount allocated to education, health, employment, youth, and sports.115 Such 
prioritizations illustrate executive dominance over the use of EI revenue. Of 
further note in this regard is that allocations to the social sector (for instance, the 
Ghana Education Trust Fund and the National Health Insurance Fund) are in 
decline and at any rate cover mainly recurrent costs to the detriment of needed 
long-term investments.  
Of particular interest to this report is the extent to which ABFA allocations have 
prioritized investments in agriculture; historically, agriculture has been fairly 
marginalized in the ABFA allocations. Between 2011 and 2013 the average 
contribution was just 6.5 percent, varying between 14 percent in 2012 and 2.5 
percent in 2013. However, increasing the contribution to agriculture has been an 
explicit campaign goal of civil society groups within Ghana, particularly through 
the Oil for Agriculture campaign. The campaign focused on asking for 30 percent 
of the ABFA to be allocated to agriculture in 2014. Following the campaign, the 
ABFA allocation to agriculture was bumped back up to 14 percent for 2014, split 
approximately 70-to-30 between farming and fishing.  
In such a case, causality is hard to discern. On the one hand, increasing the 
allocation from 2.5 percent to 14 percent is significant. On the other hand, similar 
allocations have occurred previously (being around 14 percent in 2012). The 
strong bias toward the fisheries sector, despite its impacts on poverty being more 
limited, is also notable, suggesting that features other than the logic of the 
campaign116 may have driven this allocation. Such factors notwithstanding, the 
outcome of the campaign does suggest that civil society may be able to 
effectively advocate for the allocation of oil revenues in Ghana. Bolstering such 
claims is the fact that CSOs have also been very involved in campaigning for the 
ABFA to be used to provide resources for PIAC operation. As was mentioned 
earlier, this reform was achieved with the Amendment to Act 815. Tempering this 
success, again, is the fact that the impacts of the amendment, which simply 
empower PIAC to submit a budget to the minister, are yet to be seen as the 
minister still holds discretion as to whether that budget should be funded.  
Beyond agriculture and industrialization, questions over the capitalization of the 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) have arisen as it has been noted 
that the use of the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) for GNPC 
capitalization117 is not consistent with Act 815. In fact, this issue is currently the 
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subject of a Supreme Court case pursued by a group of opposition MPs who 
allege that such usage without the approval of Parliament breaches both Act 815 
and the Constitution. As one of the plaintiffs explained: 
GNPC obviously is a major beneficiary of the distribution of the oil and gas 
revenues so how we monitor them, and make sure that they are doing the 
right thing, is very important. ... I will give you a good example. In 2013, the 
moneys that were given to GNPC, at least $32 million, were used to pay a 
debt owed by TOR, the refinery. That was not what we gave the money for. 
That’s number one. Number two, three years in a row, they [GNPC] have 
never spent all the money. They always have a surplus, which is now about 
250 million. Now this is a company that is supposed to be very good at 
budgeting. Three years in a row now they have had surpluses and they have 
always said that for technical reasons they couldn’t use the money. But this is 
an example of where they miss-supply the money [sic]. So if you look at all of 
that, it is important that we check them. The law mandates that Parliament 
approves their programs and activities every year. As far as I know for 2015, 
we have not approved [these]. Last year, what we approved did not include 
[what] they were going to borrow the money for. So I have not yet approved 
for 2014, and I have not yet approved for 2015. What is the justification for 
coming up with that type of program? Assuming that with that type of program 
Parliament decides to object, then they cannot borrow! So our case is simple. 
Let us interrogate, let us approve their programs and activities, and let’s see if 
they really need to borrow. My information is that what they need it for is a 
development that has not even been approved, so what is the rush? The 
budget that I have seen, that they brought, and which has not yet even been 
approved ... they met the energy committee and a lot of questions were 
raised. It should have come to the finance committee for us to report back to 
the plenary ... that [budget] is over bloated ... [so] we went to court to stop 
them from borrowing ... the spirit of the law is being breached! ... Our position 
at court is that the Constitution is being breached. ... [I]t’s not only a 
constitutional breach, but also a breach of the act, as the programs and the 
activities must be approved by parliament abinitio [from the beginning].118 
Clearly, GNPC capitalization has become a test case about decision-making 
concerning the use of oil revenue and the role of Parliament, and it demonstrates 
                                                                                                                                
Fund	  (Amendment	  6	  of	  the	  Petroleum	  Revenue	  Management	  [Amendment]	  Act,	  2015).	  This	  
means	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  the	  ABFA	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  purpose.	  Despite	  this	  change,	  the	  
willingness	  to	  defy	  legal	  procedure	  being	  described	  here	  remains	  emblematic	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  the	  executive	  is	  able	  to	  manipulate	  the	  management	  of	  revenues	  regardless	  of	  the	  legal	  
environment.	  In	  addition,	  the	  simple	  manner	  in	  which	  amendments	  to	  the	  act	  have	  been	  passed	  
that	  make	  this	  activity	  legal	  further	  highlight	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  executive	  branch	  is	  able	  to	  
shape	  these	  processes.	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how emerging extractive industry legal regimes are open to multiple 
interpretations.  
Also notable regarding GNPC capitalization is that neither CSOs nor local 
governments lobby for this allocation. As such, notwithstanding the successes 
just mentioned, the prioritization of capitalization within the ABFA suggests that 
the influence of civil society and local government over budget allocations might, 
in fact, be highly circumscribed. This thesis is furthered by the fact that 
amendments to the Act 815 introduced after this research had been completed 
appear, if anything, to increase the capacity for petroleum revenues to be used 
for GNPC capitalization119 and strengthen the operating potential of the GNPC.120 
In addition, the case of GNPC capitalization also suggest that prioritizations of oil 
revenue are GNPC friendly (especially as the revenue allocated to this institution 
appears not to have been fully used or approved)121 and that the minister of 
finance has historically interpreted the formal laws to suit narrow sets of interests. 
Finally, it would appear that such allocations bolster the case for characterizing 
Parliament as being in an inferior position to the executive branch of government, 
as on numerous occasions and in apparent conflict with the formal rules, 
parliamentary oversight has been circumvented.122  
Considering these factors, it appears that decision-making power over the use of 
petroleum revenues is largely centralized within the executive branch, while 
departments, agencies, local government, and civil society have only limited 
influence.  
INFLUENCING OVER BUDGET ALLOCATION 
As a precursor to discussing the way in which resources are effectively allocated 
in the budget, it is relevant to recognize that 70 percent of the total budget covers 
recurrent expenditure in the form of wages. This situation means that when 
talking about having influence over the budget it is influence over the remaining 
30 percent of the budget that is being discussed.  
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Although the overall budget process is intended to be top-down (through the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning ) and then back and forth (through 
budget hearings), studies point to a process driven by the executive branch, with 
the minister of finance delegating authority downward, through the use of 
ceilings. While the exact rationale behind the setting of ceilings is hard to 
follow,123 it appears from interviews that several key factors matter:  
1. The amount available in the overall budget 
2. The ability of a ministry to utilize previous years’ allocations 
3. The ability of a ministry to convince the Ministry of Finance that extra 
money is necessary 
4. The significance of any particular special priorities the government 
may have that limit allocation 
5. Any particular preferences or objection the Ministry of Finance may 
have against the plans of other ministries 
 
Ceilings are also influenced by factors such as the evidence base, policy 
directives, pragmatism, and political interests. Parliament has difficulty cutting 
allocations, as the decision has been made by the time the document reaches 
Parliament, and parliamentarians may find it difficult to assess the basis for a 
particular cap or to attain evidence to argue against an allocation. Conversely, 
some sources suggested that the MEFP can more easily slash allocations on the 
basis of unconvincing evidence; other sources were of the opinion that the 
discretion of the minister of finance to dictate budgetary allocations is often 
exaggerated.  
Executive control over the budget is enabled by a Parliament that is unable to 
function in its oversight capacity (Section 5). That said, it has already been 
pointed out that ministries, departments, and agencies are, on occasion, able to 
push back against executive control by ignoring the directives of the minister of 
finance, or by acting without the ministry’s authority and leveraging off-budget 
expenditure. In such instances, it is the power balance between the offending 
minister and the minister of finance that seems to matter.  
While thus far it has been useful to think of influence over the budget and 
influence over earmarked revenues as separate processes, it should be noted 
that in certain respects, influence over the budget has implications for influence 
over oil revenues and vice versa. This should make sense as, for example, one 
would expect policy priorities in the budget to mirror priorities in the ABFA. 
Likewise, one would expect sectoral allocations from the ABFA to moderate 
allocations from the budget. In this respect, it is worth noting that two prominent 
processes shape allocations of both the ABFA and the general budget: 
calculations around revenue projections and the process of policy ranking. 
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Regarding calculations around revenue projections, it is notable that allocations 
for the Annual Budget Funding Amount and national budget appear to be shaped 
not only by the revenue flows themselves but by competing interpretations about 
how much is available, how much is expected to be available, and how figures 
are reached. For example, concerning extractive industry revenue projections, in 
November 2014, the minister of finance presented the 2015 Budget Statement 
and Economic Policy to Parliament based on petroleum prices of $99 a barrel 
although prices were $80 on the day and fell to half of that through December, 
while the budget was being debated.124  
Beyond commodity price projections, the setting of budget priorities may also 
involve debate over the computation methods and public accounting systems for 
reaching particular estimations, with ministries, departments, and agencies vying 
to maximize their allocations. This process means that the accounting of public 
finance, revenue, and spending affects the priorities made in the budget and 
policy objectives. In this context, the government typically has a political interest 
in portraying the idea that there is more available in the budget than what may be 
reasonably estimated, with the consequence that budgets frequently overshoot 
actually realized revenue. 
In terms of policy ranking, the effect of this practice is evident in support given to 
initiatives such as the school feeding program, the national youth employment 
program, and the livelihood empowerment against poverty initiative. 
Nevertheless, the issue of ranking and prioritizing should not be overestimated, 
and it has to be realized that some posts, such as transport and the Office of the 
President, which are not prioritized under the Annual Budget Funding Amount 
(ABFA), received substantially more resources than agriculture in 2014, which 
(as was mentioned) was an ABFA priority. Given these observations, it is 
valuable to take a moment to explore how allocations to the agricultural budget 
are made, as agriculture is a focus point for this research. 
DRIVING ALLOCATIONS INTO AGRICULTURE 
There is broad political recognition of the significance of agriculture and of the 
Medium Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan, not least because many 
national development features are directly and indirectly affected by the plight of 
rural economies (for example, to reduce reliance on the import on basic food 
stuffs, to increase food security, to lessen rural-urban migration, and to lessen 
                                                
124	  The	  projection,	  based	  on	  a	  seven-­‐year	  rolling	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  as	  defined	  in	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  Revenue	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  to	  calls	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  Revenue	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and	  Natural	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  Governance	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energy demands). As a result, the Medium Term Agricultural Sector Investment 
Plan targets a 6 percent rate of growth in the agricultural sector (which has been 
achieved once since 2009), with an allocation of at least 10 percent of the 
national budget needed annually to meet the target set in the 2003 Maputo 
Declaration125. Regardless of such stated ambition and commitments, however, 
investments in agriculture are criticized as piecemeal (for example, programs 
such as Youth in Agriculture and Rural Growth Progress) to the point where “we 
don’t even assess the impact of the small allocations that do find their way to 
agriculture.ˮ126  
Agricultural budgeting involves several ministries, departments, and agencies 
(including fisheries, forestry, research, and feeder roads) that are guided by the 
strategies contained in the Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan 
2011–2015, and the Food and Longer Term Agriculture Sector Development 
Policy.127 Budget proposals are usually submitted to the MFEP above 
recommended ceilings, with a view to convince the MFEP that more revenue is 
necessary. The process of negotiation, described above, continues until the 
MFEP is happy that instructions to reprioritize the budget have been followed. 
Notably, however, according to the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), the parameters for any reprioritizations made by the MFEP as well as for 
subsequent budget cutting are not clear.128  
In terms of actual allocations, for the period 2010–2015 it is estimated that the 
government will contribute about a quarter of the Medium Term Agriculture 
Sector Investment Plan. When contributions from the private sector and internally 
generated funds are included, the domestic contribution will be about 34 percent, 
leaving some two-thirds to be covered by donor partners.129 These figures 
suggest that agriculture has either been earmarked as a sector for donors and 
NGOs to develop, or it has been decided that the sector should fend for itself. 
The fact that the 2011 budget allocation for the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
showed a 30 percent reduction in agricultural investment against an increase in 
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  The	  Maputo	  Declaration	  on	  Agriculture	  and	  Food	  Security	  was	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  African	  Union	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  of	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  a	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  being	  the	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  to	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  of	  at	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  10	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  of	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  to	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  and	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  development	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  Chairman	  of	  PIAC,	  address	  (at	  Multistakeholder	  Workshop	  on	  Oil	  Money	  Investment	  in	  
Agriculture,	  Dodowa,	  Ghana,	  October	  3,	  2015).	  
127	  The	  Medium	  Term	  Agriculture	  Sector	  Investment	  Plan	  aims	  to	  achieve	  at	  least	  6	  percent	  
agricultural	  growth	  annually.	  Government	  of	  Ghana,	  Medium	  Term	  Agriculture	  Sector	  
Investment	  Plan	  (METASIP)	  2011–2015,	  Ministry	  of	  Food	  and	  Agriculture,	  2010.	  	  
128	  Johnson,	  “Understanding	  the	  Real	  Budget	  Process.”	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  Samuel	  Benin,	  Tsitsi	  Makombe,	  and	  Michael	  Johnson,	  Aid	  Effectiveness	  in	  Ghana:	  How’s	  the	  
L’Aquila	  Food	  Security	  Initiative	  Doing?	  IFPRI	  Discussion	  Paper	  1359	  (International	  Food	  Policy	  
Research	  Institute	  [lFPRI],	  2014),	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personal emoluments also suggests that the government is looking to donor 
partners to cover the investment side while it is forced to cover salaries. The 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture is renowned for experiencing difficulties in 
justifying its budgets to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP) 
and Cabinet, which again is suggestive of a sector lacking political clout. It 
consistently experiences a reduction in its allocations amid claims of an inability 
to execute its budget by the minister of finance. However, there may also be 
fungability elements, where imposed reductions are expected to be covered by 
an increase in donors’ share of the Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment 
Plan costs. Tentatively, this would explain the moving of agricultural expenditure 
from investment to salaries and the reliance of the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture on support at Cabinet level to ensure cuts are not incurred—although 
donors do not always fill in the gaps left behind by government.130  
Some agricultural policies such as subsidizing fertilizer (currently by 21 percent) 
are specifically prioritized by the executive branch, and are, according to the 
Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC), rarely contested. Still, it is 
significant to note that this program is besieged with challenges, ranging from 
large-scale smuggling for export, to delays and the politicization of distribution. 
According to the chairman of the Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana, every 
year the threat of removing the subsidy hangs high, and every year “small scale 
farmers have to beg to get it backˮ, which in 2014 actually meant that despite an 
Annual Budget Funding Amount allocation, the subsidy was not forthcoming.131 
This shows that despite certain policies apparently ranking higher than others, 
they too can be cut, with the result that the inherent uncertainties of an already 
vulnerable sector are worsened. The dearth of consistency in support for the 
agricultural sector on the part of government suggests strongly that small-scale 
farmers do not have leverage over policy, and that there is no strong political 
incentive on the part of governments for long-term, serious investment in 
agriculture.  
To recap, regarding extractive industry revenue earmarking it seems that a 
complicated set of rules that took a long time to be put into place has ended up 
(according to opponents) favoring ministerial discretion. In terms of the budget, 
the process of prioritization takes place as individual spending ceilings are made 
to control line ministries exceeding limits, but this effort does not appear to rail in 
overspending. In this respect the expenditure side of the budgetary process has 
been described as so weak and undemocratic as to be “essentially ritualistic, with 
limited bearing upon reality.ˮ132 
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  K.	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132	  Killick,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Ghana’s	  Budgetary	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What stands out in this assessment of the means by which resource revenues 
are allocated in Ghana is that although formal mechanisms of accountability are 
in place, their ability to perform mandated tasks is curtailed by numerous 
capacity and incentive weaknesses including a legal inability to demand access 
to data, a lack of expertise, political constraints, conflicts of interest, a lack of 
autonomy, a lack of political will, and political and/or electorate fatigue. As a 
consequence, the legislature does not adequately monitor the implementation of 
policy, pursue civil society or constituent interests, or successfully reshape public 
policy.133 More broadly, the “underdevelopment” of accountability institutions 
exemplifies a political structure characterized by unequal relations between a 
powerful executive branch and weak legislature—a theme that is dominant in 
most of the literature used for this study.134  
This last point is a final one that requires further exploration in this study. So far 
this report has documented the means by which particular purpose-built 
oversight institutions fail, but it has not systematically looked at the manner in 
which unequal relations of power between the executive and the other branches 
of government are effectively maintained. Because such relations seem to lie at 
the heart of dysfunctional accountability in Ghana, detailing these processes is 
the task to which this report now turns. 
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6. ACCOUNTABILITY 
CONTEXT 
With the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, Ghana now has a system of 
formal government with an executive president and parliamentary system. Thus, 
the 1992 constitution provides for a formal separation of powers, though it is 
based on a hybrid executive-legislative system, ostensibly to ensure effective 
and smooth relations between Cabinet and Parliament. Members of Parliament 
(MPs) are intended to be voted into office and afford a measure of control over 
the executive.  
Based on the Constitution, the majority of ministers have to be members of 
Parliament, with the remainder being persons who are otherwise qualified to be 
MPs (without voting rights in Parliament). All must be appointed by the president 
after parliamentary approval (Article 78:1), though rejection is rare. The 
constitution (Article 82) permits Parliament to censure a minister though this too 
is rare as it requires two-thirds support from all MPs inter alia. In addition to the 
Parliament, a host of oversight institutions exist to audit the activities of the 
government and ensure that laws and policies are implemented as they should 
be.  
In reality, the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of 
government lies with the executive branch. The dominance of the executive is 
reflected in a lack of parliamentary leverage, a low level of civil society influence 
over lawmaking, a legislature and a judiciary prone to politicization, and a political 
culture of strong party loyalty that discourages internal critique.  
The influence of the executive branch can be seen in its size: 20 Cabinet 
members, eight non-Cabinet members, 10 regional ministers, and 43 deputy 
ministers, totaling 81 ministers and deputies (compared to 275 MPs). This makes 
for a mix of centralized decision-making and fragmented areas of ministerial 
autonomy, with ministers only tending to answer routine questions on the house 
floor. In terms of the budget, the ability of Parliament to control executive 
spending is weakened owning to limitations on legislative powers, where the 
president has the exclusive right to introduce into Parliament bills that have 
financial or tax implications (Article 108). Oversight is also limited by the two-
party system, which means that Parliament is dominated by the party of the 
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president, with the consequence that cross-floor processes of leverage and 
bargaining that could strengthen checks and balances have not developed.135 
Although Parliament has the legal authority to undertake oversight functions of 
the extractives sector, it is hampered by limited resources, including research 
capacity, support staff, and office facilities.136 Advice given to Parliament by 
extractive industry committees can be colored by their composition, political and 
business interests, and an unequal level of expertise between committees and 
Parliament. There is also a history of Parliament not being informed about 
important extractives industry issues until late in the process (as with budgetary 
decisions), which is otherwise required by law, and of governments shielding 
negotiation processes in the name of confidentiality. The questions of whether 
law is actually breached in such cases, whether the need for confidentiality 
allows for the temporary suspension of law, or whether centralized decision-
making shields nefarious dealings, are open for interpretation. Regarding 
oversight institutions, although numerous institutions have been created by the 
government, and although a number of these apply to the budget and to the 
governance of extractive industries, they tend to be dysfunctional and incapable 
of either holding the executive to account or galvanizing Parliament to do so.  
IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITED ACCOUNTABILITY 
In terms of the budget, the outcome of a powerful executive, democratic deficit, 
and weak Parliament is a divergence between formal rules and the practice of 
budget formulation and execution. Combined with the need for flexible budgeting, 
the result is that government planning and allocations are often inaccurate. 
Furthermore, it is common for actual expenditure not to match budget allocations. 
All of this, in turn, makes it difficult for the Minister of finance to exercise control 
and oversight, and for formal laws to be created that can cover every eventuality. 
Consequently, budgetary processes among ministries, departments, and 
agencies are incremental, based on calculated estimates and hasty guesswork, 
and devoid of qualified projections.137 This, in turn, leads to prevalent over- and 
underspending, as well as to supplementary budgets, which further complicate 
the process of reconciling allocations and expenditure.  
There are subsequently significant problems of money disappearing from the 
budget with an endemic practice of unpaid bills carried over from year to year. 
Tracking of nonsalary expenditure at the Ministry of Education, for example, 
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estimated nonarrival at the intended destination at some 49 percent, while for the 
Ministry of Health it was even higher at 79 percent. It is unclear as to how large a 
part of this problem is from leakage and maladministration, and how much is a 
result of deviations between allocations and actual distribution.  
As an example of considerable overspending without mandate, the presidency 
was reported as exceeding its budget allocation by approximately 100 percent in 
the first nine months of 2014, without parliamentary endorsement, as is law.138 
Apparently, this overspending was in part due to the cost of a large ECOWAS 
summit, which Ghana hosted, as well as the regional Ebola crisis. Evidence of 
the systematic nature of these problems comes from the reports of the Auditor 
General, which every year detail a large number of serious discrepancies and 
example after example of misappropriated funds. 
Regarding oil revenues, discretionary powers, flexibility in decision-making, and 
manipulation of forecasts have resulted in a spread of expensive projects around 
the country, which have been prioritized regardless of efficiency or value for 
money. These projects appear to be focused more on illustrating to everyday 
Ghanaians that they are receiving a share of the natural resource wealth. 
Notably, many of these projects have not been realized. For example, large road 
projects (of which there were 16 from 2011 to 2013) have frequently stalled as 
(unrealistic) oil revenue projections do not materialize. This lack of revenue, in 
turn, results in costly delays, interest duties, and project debt.139 As mentioned 
earlier, such dynamics also result in the Office of the President receiving a 
greater share of the oil revenues than was allocated to education, health, 
employment, youth, and sports. The lessons of the first round of prioritizations, 
directed by Ministry of Finance’s discretionary powers, have meant that ABFA 
expenditure in 2014 is now limited to six ministries, departments, and agencies—
down from 15 in 2013. 
The apparent lack of planning and effective prioritization of investments can 
potentially be explained by a system of patronage and rewards within 
government appointments. As one respondent remarked, the short-term 
planning, or even, decided lack of planning in expenditure decisions, was due, at 
least in part, to frequent changes in the National Development Planning 
Commission, where senior positions were politicized.140 For opponents, the 
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Oxfam America | The Weak Link: The Role of Local Institutions in Accountable Resource Management, Ghana 60 
National Development Planning Commission is where the elite are put out to 
pasture as a soft advisory institution to government. The commission’s tasks 
include analyses of macroeconomic and structural reform options, proposals for 
multiyear rolling plans, projects for the protection of the environment, and 
monitoring and evaluation of development policies, programs, and projects.  
In terms of mining, a lack of oversight on licensing agreements, high levels of 
ministerial discretion, and weak horizontal accountability mechanisms have 
resulted in major conflicts of interest. These have included, for example, a former 
chairman of the Parliament Select Committee of Minerals and Energy (which has 
the task of examining mining companies prior to the ratification of agreements) 
owning a quarry at the time, and another member owning a diamond mine.141 
Similarly, during parliamentary debates in October 2008, it came to light that 
some 21 mining companies had had licenses granted by the Ministry of Lands 
and Natural Resources, and had been in operation for up to 15 years previously, 
without ratification of their licenses by Parliament, as demanded by law. 
Regarding transgressions of the variety just described, there is thought to be little 
in the way of effective justice. The courts have a considerable backlog of all 
types of cases, a situation fostered by complex configurations of pluralist legal 
orders. This situation often means that cases are adjourned, delayed, and 
appealed through higher-level institutions for years.142 One result is that it is rare 
for public servants to be prosecuted for maladministration. 
UNDERSTANDING A PERSISTENT LACK OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The centralization of power within the executive, clearly a significant challenge to 
accountability institutions in Ghana, is not an easy issue to address. The 
country’s political structure and the dominance of Accra in the process of 
decision-making over policy and the allocation of resources originated within the 
colonial formulation of the state and was further entrenched by the 21 years of 
military rule that the country subsequently experienced. This structure, reflecting 
the colonial model where control over decision-making and resources was set up 
based on a logic of extracting resources from the hinterland and moving them 
through the capital back to Europe remain in place today with political and 
economic power rooted in the south, while a weaker political and economic north 
is dependent on the trickle down of resources from wealth-generating hubs. The 
corollary is that despite democratization, decentralization, and liberalization, the 
political economy remains basically unchanged: peripherally situated elites look 
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to the center in the hope of securing the redistribution of centrally controlled 
resources to their areas (Section 6 provides for more details). At the same time, 
the redistribution mechanisms legitimize the centralization of decision-making 
with maximal control over the economic resources. Politically, this means that 
local elites are generally detached and unaccountable to ordinary citizens and 
are overwhelmingly focused on upward mobility.143 Consequently, the retention of 
centralized control over economic resources is the most politically viable option 
from the perspective of the executive. 
Considering the persistent weakness on the part of Parliament to hold the 
government to account—or to force it to exercise restrain—the problem is 
multifaceted. First, it is worth noting that this situation is likely a partial outcome 
of the aforementioned period of military rule, which hindered the development of 
the legislature. Second, Parliament is characterized by strong levels of party 
loyalty, a possible product both of cultural norms such as political cultural psyche 
of reverence to authority and older, “Big Men,” and of skewed incentives. On the 
part of skewed incentives the issues are twofold.  
First, because MP candidatures are decided through party primary elections that 
are characterized by patronage spending and vote buying, aspirants have to form 
relationships with party members who then link them with voters via local party 
offices.144 The process is demand driven; executives will strive to ensure the 
candidature of their favorite while providing incentives for opponent(s) to drop 
out. The outcome is that Parliament as a representative organ is compromised, 
as the ability to mobilize wealth and top-down support become defining factors 
and elections are perceived to favor certain individuals. The imposition of 
candidates from above can also marginalize local-level members and breed 
opposition. Party executives also play a central role in the vetting and selection of 
candidates (where national and constituency executive members have veto 
rights). Vetting can avert primary contests while enabling the competition to 
continue. Vetting typically takes place in resource-weak (rural) areas. Here, the 
wealthiest candidate will normally gain the executive’s support while contestants 
will attempt to influence voting with the provision of materials on election day.145 
In this way, good connections, loyalty to senior figures, and the ability to generate 
funding, as well as the ability to secure support within the party more generally, 
become the sine qua non for a successful candidature and potential election to 
Parliament. Such alliances and obligations are carried into and reproduced in 
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Parliament where party loyalty translates to support for government agendas and 
the negation of any executive oversight mechanisms. 
Second, once they are in Parliament, parliamentarians have few incentives to 
dissent against the will of the party because the ruling party enjoys the majority, 
and up-and-coming ruling party MPs aspire to become ministers. The 
Constitution also forbids “crossing the floorˮ146 (Article 97) with the consequence 
being the loss one’s seat. Thus, there is a greater incentive for ruling-party MPs 
to exhibit party and government loyalty, and to develop within party ranks instead 
of airing critiques and seeking to hold their government to account though the 
formal set of rules.  
These factors together shape a winner-takes-all parliamentary system that lacks 
effectiveness as an institution of checks and balances on the executive.147 The 
weakness of Parliament is also reflected in the fact that there is no history of the 
pursuance of private member bills (bills introduced by individual MPs rather than 
by individuals acting on behalf of the executive branch).148 The frail social 
contract between the machinery of government and the citizenry (besides at 
election times) is evident in domestic extractive industry revenue-sharing 
formulas as well as in agreements made between international oil and mining 
companies and the government. The making of revenue-sharing agreements, 
both in the past and present, has been a predominantly top-down, closed affair, 
sanctioned first by the executive, and passed by a loyal parliamentary majority. 
The weakness of Parliament was described by a senior member of an 
established civil society organization in the following way: 
We are also now seeing increased collusion in Parliament between the 
majority and minority over, for instance, oil contracts, where [historically] we 
have not seen any opposition at all. ... [A]s you know, elections are very tight 
here, and either party can win at any time, so it’s like a gentleman’s 
agreement “you do it now, and when we come we do” ... and you can see 
that collusion also being translated into opposition to transparency 
frameworks. Currently, there is a bill in Parliament on how to license oil 
blocks, and we are asking for some transparency standards, and you have 
both the majority and minority strongly opposed to that. They try to water it 
down. ... They, as MPs, have lost confidence in their own parliamentary 
platform. 149 
In terms of oversight, key state institutions that have the responsibility to oversee 
executive decisions related to economic and political governance are considered 
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  Crossing	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  Senior	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 The Weak Link: The Role of Local Institutions in Accountable Resource Management, Ghana  | Oxfam America 63 
generally dysfunctional owing to the fact that the Office of the President appoints 
their leaders.150 Indeed, it is established constitutional practice that all non-civil 
service public office positions are vested in the president. 
In general, oversight institutions are rendered dysfunctional by the president 
appointing their leadership, by limiting their access to funding, by not affording 
them prosecutorial powers, and by limiting their investigative capacity. The 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), for example, 
does not have prosecutorial powers and has to depend on the attorney general, 
who is also a member of Cabinet in the capacity of minister of justice.151 This 
configuration raises the likelihood of disincentives against possible prosecutions 
of fellow senior party colleagues, and it has led to calls for the separation of the 
office of attorney general from the Ministry of Justice. In these ways, the 
effectiveness of oversight intuitions simply become reliant on other institutions, 
such as Parliament, which is compromised for the reasons just mentioned. 
Besides this predicament, there is widespread belief that the president has 
excessive discretionary power in the appointment of judges. It is also 
commonplace to allege executive interference in prosecutions.152 There is also 
evidence of the capture of the judiciary by political parties and of political party 
influence over the appointments of judges. Structurally, networks of patronage 
between the judiciary and executive develop owing to the winner-takes-all 
system and single-party dominance of government, and to the inability or 
unwillingness of Parliament to rein in such practices.153 There is an “apparent 
high incidence of party political appointments to both the Ministry of Justice and 
Attorney General’s Department, … the Judicial Council, the Commission for 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice and the Serious Fraud Office.” 154 
At all levels, courts are found to be “relatively depoliticised” as the Judicial 
Council and Bar Association can “make recommendations for both the 
nomination and promotion of judges and hence check the appointing powers of 
the president.”  Nonetheless it has been noted that politicization is greatest at the 
center of ministerial bureaucracies where positions such as chief directors and 
deputies are often politically influenced. Manipulation at lower levels, such as 
appointments of heads of sections, is also common, although it may contravene 
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relevant law.155 The view that the judiciary is compromised is one that is shared 
by the general population, and it is among the conclusions of the 2014 
Afrobarometer report on Ghana, indicating that there is presently not much public 
faith in the institution.156 Generally, it is perceived as slow, expensive, potentially 
corrupt, and illegitimate.  
Finally, in addition to the problems of political control and incentives described 
above, it appears that, to some extent, capacity problems and technical issues 
also play a role in undermining accountability. For example, as mentioned above, 
existing discretion, enshrined in the law, which empowers the executive to make 
decisions over the use of oil wealth, has been exacerbated by contestation over 
how the law should be interpreted. Despite the efforts in Ghana to generate an 
effective legal framework for managing oil revenues, part of the problem is 
thought to be that the process of establishing a solid legal framework to manage 
extractive industry revenue flows was one step behind the actual flow of revenue. 
The result is that oil revenues are used to satisfy a relatively narrow societal 
group of oil and gas interests. As one informant explained: 
[It] is clear in my mind that the intent of Act 815 was to try to bring 
transparency in the revenue management of oil and gas. There is no question 
in my mind. But if you know the history of legislation, the commission should 
have been set up even before the law came in. But there was no petroleum 
commission. We were dealing with all the production law, but because 
revenues were going to accrue, we needed to do things quickly. In terms of 
sequence it was wrong, but we should have first made the commission, then 
the production, then the oil. But when the oil was flowing the production law 
was not yet forthcoming ...157 
Having outlined the processes by which revenues are shared and budgets 
formulated, as well as the accountability failings within these processes, it is 
necessary to briefly reflect on the extent to which decentralization has been 
effective in Ghana. This is necessary in order to determine the extent to which 
local government has a role to play in affecting budget priorities. As has been 
mentioned, certain revenues, including those from mining, are allocated directly 
to the local level, while disbursements from the Consolidated Fund will also 
contain some contributions from mining revenues. Understanding the extent to 
which autonomy over decision-making has been handed to local governments is 
therefore important. Finally, much ambition around efforts to wrest control of the 
budget from the executive has focused on the possibility for participatory 
budgeting at the local level. In order to assess such possibilities, it is therefore 
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important to explore the structures, capacities, and incentives operating at these 
scales. 
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7. A NOTE ON 
DECENTRALIZATION 
The present-day system of local government in Ghana is traceable to the colonial 
policy of indirect rule. Representation on the basis of ballot box was introduced in 
the 1950s but dismantled in the 1960s when Kwame Nkrumah sought to 
centralize power under a one-party state. The contemporary system is based on 
the 1988 Local Government Act (Provisional National Defence Council, PNDC 
law 207), which created a five-tiered pyramidal system of nonpartisan local 
government, with elections every four years. The law created 110 metropolitan, 
municipal, and district assemblies. These are the most important local 
government institutions, below which are district councils, urban councils, zonal 
councils, town councils, area councils, and unit committees. District assemblies 
were given a wide range of some 85 functions covering revenue generation, 
administration, planning, infrastructure, and security. 
Besides the formal elections, there is a general democratic and participatory 
deficit within local government institutions. This deficit stems from a lasting 
tension among the center of wanting to simultaneously deepen democracy and 
gain legitimacy (particularly in Ghana via the incorporation of the chiefs), and 
being concerned over a loss of control by the center, the atomization of regions, 
and certain underdeveloped areas not being able to financially sustain 
themselves.  
The challenge of balancing central control and local autonomy continue to shape 
the politics of local participation today. The result is a complex formula for 
representation, power sharing, influence, and accountability that has been 
implanted into existing local institutions of power and authority. In this respect, a 
typical assembly consists of (1) locally elected assembly members chosen on the 
basis of universal adult suffrage (one for each ward, demarcated by the electoral 
commission), (2) an executive district chief executive appointed directly by the 
president,158 (3) the constituency MP or MPs who have a nonvoting membership, 
(4) other members not exceeding 30 percent of the total membership of the 
Assembly appointed by the president in consultation with the traditional 
authorities and other interest groups in the district,159 and (5) a presiding member 
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  This	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  is	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  Local	  Government	  Act	  (Act	  462),	  Section	  5(1)d.	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elected by the assembly members with two-thirds majority of all assembly 
members.  
Such a formula affords the central government a relatively firm hold on power 
through control over a third of assembly members and restrictions on locally 
chosen actors’ ability to assume key decision-making positions. Elected 
assembly members are often unable to muster the majority needed to remove a 
district chief executive, leaving this post effectively open to presidential 
appointment. The loyalties of the assembly executive are generally biased 
toward their appointers at the center, and not the locality (Section 6). This means 
the locally placed executive satisfies their own needs first with a deficit of 
downward accountability, which in turn justifies continued direction from the 
center.160 
Concerning traditional authorities, the consultative role they can play suggests 
their interests are compatible with assembly members as well as the executive. 
In practice however, many chiefs enjoy more influence than their consultative 
position intends, a reflection of their revered position in the community and their 
status as professed owners of the land the district is situated upon. The cultural 
reverence for chieftaincy has meant there is a long history of chiefs appropriating 
revenue earmarked for either the stool or for the benefit of local communities as 
personal property and a source of personal income.161 In this respect, authority is 
frequently contested between elected individuals and the chiefs, with those 
contests taking place in a hybrid mix of formal and informal spheres. 
Regardless of such contests and the extent to which the executive maintains 
power over decentralized institutions, it worth noting that the revenue available to 
these groups is relatively small. The small amount of money from mining 
revenues has already been mentioned as has the fact that it includes no 
requirements for local consultation in determining spending priorities. Similarly, 
no portion of oil revenues is earmarked for local government. Regarding access 
to centralized revenues, under the current formula, salaries and pensions (the 
largest posts), as well as operational and administrative expenses, are all 
covered centrally.162 This leaves little funding available for local discretion and 
further means the loyalties of locally placed public sector staff, including customs 
officers, police, doctors, magistrates, and teachers, are directed toward the 
center rather than local government.163 
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Finally, even if one assumed both the willingness on the part of the local 
government to respond to the interest of the local populations and the resources 
available to spend, local challenges would remain in terms of generating a 
functional local polity. These challenges include low levels of education, literacy, 
and numeracy rates in outerlying areas. Although the participation of women in 
local government institutions appears to be increasing in some areas, it is still 
very low, averaging between only 5 and 14 percent. Challenges in this respect 
include a range of local sociocultural norms, including women’s lack of 
confidence in confronting men, intimidation from powerful men, women’s 
domestic workload, traditions of obeying men, polygamy, and the notion that 
“politics” is widely considered a male activity.164 Undoubtedly, these features of 
rural life, which also impact negatively on efforts to improve women’s access to 
land, would pose similarly serious challenges to local engagement over the 
investment of locally available resources.165 
With all of the above in mind, a final task for this research is to explore the extent 
to which civil society has the capacity to affect revenue collection, allocation, and 
accountability. 
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8. OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR CSO INFLUENCE 
Prior to reflecting on the extent to which it is thought that civil society is able to 
influence revenue allocations and accountability structures, it is first important to 
recognize the methodological difficulties in trying to assess this process. 
Naturally, CSOs and NGOs have an interest in taking credit for any policy 
changes that overlap with their own objectives. Likewise, government may give 
nonstate actors some credit for certain policy outcomes even though these may 
well be based on an entirely different set of dynamics that are obscured from 
immediate view. Conversely, any apparent neglect of participatory inputs that, for 
example, might be evident in the budget need not necessarily reflect government 
not wanting to support particular priorities—as civil society will typically claim. 
Instead, it may be the result of a range of other factors. Therefore, this report 
cannot conclusively state whether participatory inputs drive resource allocations 
and accountability reforms; this report advises that such relationships be the 
subject of further research.  
The above notwithstanding, it can be noted that civil society has experienced 
some success in influencing the governance of extractive industries. It is clear, 
for example, that civil society was able to influence the governance of the oil 
sector in a way that was not apparent in the mineral sector. In this respect, it is 
popularly understood that pressure from civil society resulted in Ghana joining 
the EITI,166 and that civil society played an important role in shaping the 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), especially the formation of the 
Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). While these examples 
certainly highlight the potential capacity for civil society to shape these 
processes, a closer look also highlights some of the limitations. For example, 
when one considers that GEITI has difficulty in fulfilling its mandate, that it lacks 
funding, has no legal backing, and improves Ghana’s international reputation, 
then the claim of government bowing to civil society pressure is less certain.  
In terms of the writing of the PRMA and the creation of PIAC, it seems that civil 
society has had some important successes—especially since the government 
was initially opposed to PIAC’s formation. Not only does civil society appear to 
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have been instrumental in creating these institutions, PIAC has, for example, 
been able to achieve some modest successes under very trying circumstances 
(mentioned above). Despite these successes, the limited powers afforded to 
PIAC, along with its history of inadequate resourcing, highlight the difficulties civil 
society has had in trying to rein in the established power of the executive. The 
same can be said for the PRMA. While it is impossible to imagine what revenue 
allocations would have looked like without the legislation in place, it seems 
reasonable to assume that this legislation has resulted in at least marginal 
improvements in the oversight of the country’s oil revenues. As with PIAC, 
however, the manner in which the executive has been able to circumvent 
controls on the allocation of revenues to different funds suggests that the 
challenge for reform-minded actors within civil society is ongoing. 
Looking at budget processes, as interactions between CSOs and government 
are generally informal and ad hoc, it is difficult to accurately assess the effects, if 
any, that CSOs have on public administration and political decision-making 
regarding the shaping of budgetary prioritizations. However, the immediate 
impression is that participatory influence over budget allocations is marginal and 
potentially coincidental. For example, considering that many nonstate actors 
focus on “softˮ agendas relating to education and health, it is reasonable to 
assume that if they did enjoy meaningful leverage, these sectors would take up a 
bigger place in budget priorities and investment planning.  
Taking SEND167 as an example, Dogbe writes that through long-term commitment 
with multiple local and global stakeholders, this coalition has successfully 
influenced education and health “policies and programmes in favour of the poor 
and marginalized.”168 This does not immediately fit, however, with budgetary 
allocations to these sectors which, in recent years, have either stagnated or 
declined as a percentage of GDP to levels that are lower than those allocated by 
similar lower-middle-income countries.169  
Reconsidering the above, it may be the case that CSO pressure on government, 
rather than increasing spending, has meant cuts are less than they otherwise 
would have been. Evidence for such a claim is obviously hard to sustain, but 
might include, for example, successful campaigning to keep agricultural 
modernization as an Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) prioritization for 
2014–2017. That said, it is worth noting that the budgetary allocation to the 
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health sector of between 10.5 and 12.5 percent falls short of the Abuja 
Declaration figure of 15 percent and fits ill with CSO claims of meaningful 
leverage. 
Such claims are further undermined when one considers that the stagnation of 
health allocations from the national budget have coincided with government 
policy that has sought to institutionalize the use of (districts’) internally generated 
funds and user fees as a means to cover a host of service costs, including 
education. In this respect then, it would seem that ISODEC, a leading actor in 
education that has contributed to several bills, has had limited effect, at least 
regarding its principal aim, which for years has been to sustain the central role of 
the state in the provision of such services.170  
In conclusion, despite generally free and fair elections and despite peaceful 
transfers of power from one government to the next since 1996,171 Ghana’s high 
levels of poverty, blatant developmental-geographical divides, and widening 
income disparities, do not appear to have generated cross-cutting economic, 
political, or social interest groups with proven records of shaping budgetary 
decisions.172 Numerous factors appear to limit the formation of influential broad-
based civil society organizations, including:173 
! A relatively low level of civil society involvement in the democratic 
process, besides voting174 
! The hierarchical structure of society/reverence for authority/gender 
bias/age bias 
! A relatively closed political culture175 
! Relatively high levels of ethnic diversity176 
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  a	  Better	  Ghana’:	  Party	  Competition,	  Institutionalization	  and	  
Alternation	  in	  Ghana’s	  2008	  Elections,”	  African	  Affairs	  108,	  no.	  433	  (2009):	  621–41.	  
172	  The	  role	  of	  the	  recently	  formed	  Occupy	  Ghana	  constellation	  remains	  to	  be	  seen,	  but	  the	  
impact	  of	  civil	  society	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  changed	  noticeably	  over	  the	  last	  decade.	  See,	  for	  
example,	  Shepherd	  and	  Gyimah-­‐Boadi,	  Bridging	  the	  North	  South	  Divide?,	  3.	  
173	  Notably,	  all	  of	  these	  factors	  are	  stated	  on	  a	  relative	  basis.	  In	  this	  regard,	  compared	  with	  many	  
African	  democracies,	  Ghana	  has	  a	  relatively	  high	  level	  of	  CSO	  participation,	  has	  an	  open	  political	  
culture,	  and	  has	  managed	  its	  ethnic	  tensions	  successfully.	  That	  said,	  compared	  with	  many	  other	  
countries	  in	  the	  world,	  these	  issues	  still	  present	  as	  barriers	  to	  civil	  society	  leverage.	  Suggestive	  of	  
this	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  Ghana	  ranks	  one	  point	  above	  average	  on	  the	  Civicus	  Enabling	  Environment	  
Index	  (EEI)	  in	  2013:	  http://civicus.org/eei/.	  
174	  Dogbe,	  Follow	  the	  Money,	  7.	  	  
175	  Paul	  Stacey,	  “Political	  Structure	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Recognition	  and	  Representation	  in	  Ghana,”	  
Development	  and	  Change	  46,	  no.	  1	  (2015),	  and	  Jeffrey	  W.	  Paller,	  “Informal	  Institutions	  and	  
Personal	  Rule	  in	  Urban	  Ghana,”	  African	  Studies	  Review	  57,	  no.	  3	  (2014).	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! Historical and contemporary institutionalization of centralized decision-
making 
! Technical nature of public financial management, which demands 
expertise177 
! Difficulties in accessing or inability to access relevant data to 
monitor/evaluate/advise on budgetary issues 
! An often overt CSO focus on singular issues rather than holistic analysis   
! CSO coalition members having unrealistic expectations178  
! Politicization/accusations of politicization of individual CSOs179 
! Short-term (donor) funding of CSO budgetary studies180  
! Competition within CSO coalitions to capture funds to pursue own 
agendas  
! Loss of synergy owing to competition between CSOs/NGOs over funding 
 
Although there are indications that civil society has been able to leverage 
influence over the use of extractive industry revenues in the budget, it is difficult 
to know whether these are simply coincidental or indications of major civil society 
impact. The case for major direct influence is undermined by the fact that areas 
of civil society concern tend not to receive robust, recurrent prioritization in terms 
of funding. It seems then that in the Ghanaian context, civil society is working in a 
highly constrained environment wherein executive control over the budget is 
significant. In this respect, potential successes of civil society campaigning are 
certainly notable, even if they are not clearly significant.  
The above notwithstanding, certain ministries may be more open to influence, 
ideas, and suggestions from civil society than others, as is the case of the 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). The extent to 
which this openness is a reflection of the particular ministry or is the result of the 
considerable amount of attention given to local government and rural 
development by an army of donors and NGO projects is hard to tell. That said, 
the deputy minister at the MLGRD described the situation as follows:  
                                                                                                                                
176	  Christian	  Lund,	  “‘Bawku	  Is	  Still	  Volatile’:	  Ethno-­‐Political	  Conflict	  and	  State	  Recognition	  in	  
Northern	  Ghana,”	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  African	  Studies	  41,	  no.	  4	  (2003):	  587–610;	  and	  Catherine	  
Boone	  and	  Dennis	  Kwame	  Duku,	  “Ethnic	  Land	  Rights	  in	  Western	  Ghana:	  Landlord-­‐Stranger	  
Relations	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Era,”	  Development	  and	  Change	  43,	  no.	  3	  (2012):	  671–93.	  
177	  On	  this	  topic,	  it’s	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  an	  intense	  media	  spat	  was	  	  
playing	  out	  between	  senior	  figures	  at	  IMANI	  Center	  for	  Policy	  and	  Education	  and	  the	  Controller	  
and	  Accountant	  General’s	  Department	  (CAGD)	  over	  formal	  qualifications	  and	  the	  competence	  to	  
pass	  judgment	  on	  accounting	  mechanisms.	  	  
178	  See	  Dogbe,	  Follow	  the	  Money.	  
179	  For	  example,	  the	  Committee	  for	  Joint	  Action	  (CJA)	  aligned	  to	  the	  NDC,	  and	  the	  Alliance	  for	  
Accountable	  Governance	  (AFAG)	  aligned	  to	  the	  New	  Patriotic	  Party	  (NPP).	  Dogbe,	  Follow	  the	  
Money,	  23.	  	  
180	  Dogbe,	  Follow	  the	  Money,	  30–31.	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We have been able to strike a very good balance with our donor partners in 
[certain] areas and some cases with CSOs. Some CSOs are here already…. 
I have just started working on something with an NGO on water provision. 
This is what I am doing on paper together with them, so that we can improve 
upon water and sanitation in the rural areas. So we have great collaborations, 
and we try as much as possible to depend on them when we are drafting 
policies and programs for such things. Exactly that is why we wanted to 
develop those four problematic areas over the period. We have seen that in 
Ghana we have shortfalls in potable water provision, we have shortfalls in 
rural housing, we have shortfalls in job creation. A lot of our youth are all 
migrating to the urban centers, but we think when we create small micro 
industries and enterprises in the rural areas, they will stay there. So it is all as 
a result of inputs, we are looking at past policies and programs that made us 
determine these problematic areas, and with our donor partners, we are all 
interested in these four areas so we have a very smooth working relationship 
with them.181 
It should also be recognized that there is an increasing number of politically 
connected policy think tanks182 that are able to provide the formal political system 
with high-quality data on a wide range of issues from which informed policy 
decisions can be made, and which might effectively influence the budget. Their 
level of competence and possible influence lies with their founders and partners 
often having occupied very high positions in Ghanaian political and economic 
society, prior to think tank work. An example is the Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
founded by Dr. Kwabena Duffuor who was a former minister at the MFEP and 
former governor of the Central Bank of Ghana. Still, it is outside the scope of this 
report to assess accurately these relationships and the conditions that influence 
the impact of such civil society institutions on public policymaking.183 The role of 
think tanks is something for future research, given that they do not fall under the 
traditional umbrella of civil society organizations, pressure groups, or NGOs.  
Finally, looking at the impact of civil society on improving governance more 
generally, the evidence again suggests that successes have been few and far 
between, with success or failure determined by the particular idiosyncrasies of 
the individual cases, while the effects on governance structures remains limited. 
                                                
181	  Hon.	  Nii	  Lantey	  Vanderpuye,	  deputy	  minister,	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  Government	  and	  Rural	  
Development,	  interview,	  January	  20,	  2015.	  	  
182	  The	  use	  of	  “think	  tanks”	  here	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  work	  has	  excluded	  looking	  at	  the	  
influence	  of	  other	  think	  tanks.	  Instead	  the	  term	  is	  being	  used	  to	  describe	  those	  specific	  think	  
tanks	  where	  channels	  of	  influence	  through	  established	  political	  connections	  might	  be	  significant.	  	  
183	  Notable	  think	  tanks	  include	  the	  Institute	  for	  Democratic	  Governance	  (IDEG),	  the	  Institute	  of	  
Economic	  Affairs	  (IEA),	  the	  Ghana	  Centre	  for	  Democratic	  Development	  (CDD),	  the	  Legal	  
Resources	  Centre	  (LRC),	  the	  Integrated	  Social	  Development	  Centre	  (ISODEC),	  and	  the	  Institute	  for	  
Fiscal	  Studies	  (IFS).	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A good example is the professed success of the Committee for Joint Action 
(CJA) that uncovered gross maladministration of the Ghana School Feeding 
Programme (GSFP) in 2007, which resulted in drastic changes and dismissals of 
senior staff. The apparent success in this case appears to be driven by the 
persistence of the campaign, by the fact that it concerned education, and by the 
involvement of a major donor. In addition, the case raised a considerable amount 
of media, political, and public attention, partly because the scandal took place 
less than half a year before presidential elections, at a time when the incumbent 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) was behind in the polls.  
The degree to which this case has served to improve accountability, however, is 
less clear. In this respect, it appears that the removal of the senior public officials 
by then President John Kufuor was a price worth paying to reduce damage.184 
Notably, after the scandal, Kufuor re-established control with the appointment of 
new heads, isolated government from the maladministration at GSFP, and 
gained the support of civil society for taking firm action. Besides the immediate 
shakeup, however, serious anomalies and fraudulent activities continued—or 
started anew—at GSFP when just 18 months later, a further three deputies were 
removed (these departures received much less attention). This incident suggests 
that even as the program was undertaking much called for “changesˮ under 
watchful CSO eyes, the institutionalized incentives and opportunities for 
maladministration that initially gave rise to the case continued unabated.185 In this 
respect, there are present-day indications that the GSFP still experiences 
sporadic maladministration. In December 2014, for instance, the district chief 
executive of Jirapa District was removed from office by the Ministry for Local 
Government and Rural Development after persistent allegations and complaints 
by youth groups about the diversion of GSFP funding and the selling of related 
contracts.186 It is beyond the scope of this report to determine whether the Jirapa 
District incident is an isolated one, but it is certainly indicative of the uphill 
challenges CSOs face in bringing about serious institutional change within public 
institutions.  
Another recent example of success is that of the former NDC attorney general–
turned-whistleblower Martin Amidu, who has won three Supreme Court cases 
resulting in the retrieval of funds to state coffers. Although Amidu’s examples 
show how the judiciary can be effective in punishing fraud, such cases are 
                                                
184	  The	  New	  Patriotic	  Party	  (NPP)	  was	  ahead	  in	  the	  polls	  by	  October	  2008,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  
medium-­‐term	  political	  cost	  of	  Kufuor’s	  move	  was	  indeed	  negligible.	  	  
185	  Kwame	  Frimpong,	  “Gov’t	  Is	  Mishandling	  School	  Feeding	  Programme—CJA,”	  Politics,	  
Peacefmonline.com,	  September	  24,	  2009.	  
http://elections.peacefmonline.com/pages/politics/200909/27514.php.	  
186	  Naa	  Sakwaba	  Akwa,	  “NDC	  Youth	  Welcome	  Decision	  to	  Remove	  DEC	  from	  Office,”	  
Myjoyonline.com,	  December	  5,	  2014,	  http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2014/December-­‐
5th/ndc-­‐youth-­‐welcome-­‐decision-­‐to-­‐remove-­‐dec-­‐from-­‐office.php#sthash.ogittrua.dpuf.	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exceptional in that success demands that a centrally placed and powerful figure 
has the courage to step forward.187 Again, it’s difficult to assess the extent to 
which such actions have forced meaningful change within public institutions.  
When examining cases of corruption in Ghana, what stands out is that they cover 
all corners of public administration—from high to low, traversing multiple 
ministries, departments and agencies—and single out individuals rather than 
dysfunctional institutions. Such cases rarely come to light if it were not for tip-offs 
or whistleblowers, or continual pressure from civil society and the media. This 
observation suggests strongly that accountability mechanisms within and 
between public institutions remain wanting, or are nonexistent.188  
Finally, in looking at the capacity of civil society to identify maladministration 
within the budget, through efforts to track the flow of resources, the case is again 
ambiguous. A review of 16 different follow-the-money efforts in Ghana suggests 
that although the budget can be analyzed at the national level189 (in terms of 
allocations, for example), efforts to follow the money are limited by the fact that 
the budget system in Ghana is hard to understand,190 with information on local 
budgets very difficult to come by.191 Problems in this regard include (1) cases of 
the subnational budgets and subsector budgets not being broken down (despite 
the former being required by law),192 (2) the use of in-kind payments, which 
cannot be tracked and reconciled with the budget,193 (3) a lack of records or a 
                                                
187	  One	  whistleblower	  declined	  to	  be	  interviewed	  for	  this	  project	  with	  the	  remark,	  “Human	  rights	  
in	  this	  country	  are	  not	  what	  they	  should	  be.ˮ	  (Anonymous,	  interview,	  January	  18,	  2015.)	  
188	  Dogbe	  writes	  that	  payments	  to	  nonexistent	  people	  amounts	  to	  over	  $31	  million	  annually	  (	  
Dogbe,	  Follow	  the	  Money,	  32).	  An	  audit	  of	  the	  Ghana	  Education	  Service	  wage	  bill	  revealed	  3,298	  
potential	  duplicate	  employees.	  See	  “Fix	  Messy	  Mechanised	  Payroll,”	  Daily	  Guide,	  January	  15,	  
2015.	  	  
189	  ISODEC,	  Benefit	  Incidence	  Analysis	  for	  the	  Education,	  Health	  and	  Water	  Sector	  in	  Ghana:	  
Strengthening	  Institutions	  for	  Public	  Expenditure	  Accountability	  (2009);	  ISODEC,	  Programme	  
Budgeting	  in	  the	  Education,	  Health	  and	  Water	  Sectors	  in	  Ghana:	  Strengthening	  Institutions	  for	  
Public	  Expenditure	  Accountability	  (2009);	  ISODEC-­‐UNICEF,	  Analysis	  of	  the	  2010	  National	  Budget	  
and	  Economic	  Policy	  Statement	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Ghana	  to	  Determine	  Gaps	  and	  
Opportunities	  for	  Women	  and	  Children	  (2010);	  and	  ISODEC,	  Preliminary	  Analysis	  of	  Education	  
Sector	  Expenditure	  Allocation	  for	  2013,	  Budget	  Brief	  (2013).	  
190	  Xiao	  Ye	  and	  Sudharshan	  Canagarajah,	  “Efficiency	  of	  Public	  Expenditure	  Distribution	  and	  
Beyond:	  A	  Report	  on	  Ghana’s	  2000	  Public	  Expenditure	  Tracking	  Survey	  in	  the	  Sectors	  of	  Primary	  
Health	  and	  Education,”	  Africa	  Region	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  31	  (Washington,	  DC:	  World	  Bank,	  
2002).	  	  
191	  ISODEC,	  Benefit	  Incidence	  Analysis	  for	  the	  Education,	  Health	  and	  Water	  Sector	  in	  Ghana.	  
192	  ISODEC,	  Benefit	  Incidence	  Analysis	  for	  the	  Education,	  Health	  and	  Water	  Sector	  in	  Ghana.	  
193	  Ye	  and	  Canagarajah,	  “Efficiency	  of	  Public	  Expenditure	  Distribution.”	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lack of access to records194 at service delivery points, which makes budget 
tracking impossible. 
The lack of records is principally thought to be a capacity problem; multiple 
reports identify problems of bad filing practices.195 These practices were thought 
to be driven in part by high turnover rates among staff and directors, which meant 
that records were lost or maintenance practices changed.196 In terms of 
accessing records, cases of staff refusing to release records was thought to be a 
cultural artifact by which administrators either “keep their heads down” or simply 
conform to an established culture of secrecy.197 
Successful efforts to reconcile budgetary allocations with expenditures were 
found to be reliant on reasonable record keeping, although it is unclear what 
exactly drove practices of good record keeping compared to cases of poor record 
keeping. Issues of access to records were occasionally overcome by getting buy-
in from senior officials within the ministry– often in form of a letter - which could 
be shown to local administrators.198 Likewise, offering assurances that the work 
was not an audit, and ensuring cordial relations between NGO staff and 
government officials proved to be important.199 
Finally, it should be noted that the intention of these efforts to “follow the money” 
was often to make recommendations that would allow for the money to be 
tracked more effectively in the future, not to generate some form of accountability 
response in cases of maladministration.200 On the point of maladministration, it 
should also be noted that in ways similar to what has been mentioned above, 
even where major maladministration was apparent—as in the finding of large 
numbers of ghost employees being on the payroll—achieving any sort of 
response from the government often proved difficult.201 In this respect, it is 
possible that efforts aimed at “following the money” need to rethink their theories 
of change in terms of how they intend to affect accountability. In this regard, it 
                                                
194	  Edward	  Ampratwum,	  Daniel	  Armah-­‐Attoh,	  and	  Maxwell	  Agyei	  Ashon,	  Public	  Expenditure	  
Tracking	  Survey	  in	  Education:	  Tracking	  Possible	  Leakages	  in	  the	  Supply	  and	  Distribution	  of	  
Textbooks	  in	  Public	  Primary	  Schools	  in	  Ghana,	  Research	  Paper	  20	  (CDD-­‐Ghana,	  2012);	  and	  
Edward	  Ampratwum	  and	  Daniel	  Armah-­‐Attoh,	  Leakages	  in	  the	  Supply	  and	  Distribution	  of	  Core-­‐
Textbooks	  in	  Public	  Primary	  Schools	  in	  Ghana,	  Briefing	  Paper	  11,	  no.	  3	  (CDD-­‐Ghana,	  2012).	  	  
195	  Edward	  Ampratwum	  and	  Daniel	  Armah-­‐Attoh,	  Public	  Expenditure	  Tracking	  Survey	  in	  
Education:	  Tracking	  Capitation	  Grant	  In	  Public	  Primary	  Schools	  In	  Ghana,	  Research	  Paper,	  Ghana	  
Center	  for	  Democratic	  Development	  (CDD)	  19	  (CDD-­‐Ghana,	  2010).	  
196	  Ampratwum,	  Armah-­‐Attoh,	  and	  Ashon,	  Public	  Expenditure	  Tracking	  Survey	  in	  Education.	  
197	  Ampratwum,	  Armah-­‐Attoh,	  and	  Ashon,	  Public	  Expenditure	  Tracking	  Survey	  in	  Education.	  
198	  Ampratwum,	  Armah-­‐Attoh,	  and	  Ashon,	  Public	  Expenditure	  Tracking	  Survey	  in	  Education.	  
199	  ISODEC,	  Programme	  Budgeting	  in	  the	  Education,	  Health	  and	  Water	  Sectors	  in	  Ghana.	  
200	  ISODEC,	  Programme	  Budgeting	  in	  the	  Education,	  Health	  and	  Water	  Sectors	  in	  Ghana.	  
201	  Ye	  and	  Canagarajah,	  “Efficiency	  of	  Public	  Expenditure.”	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was noted that one particular case of success was based on holding consultative 
forums to vet the findings from efforts rather than seek out maladministration.202 
This finding points to using “follow the money” efforts to highlight failings in the 
system and to suggest ways to address them rather than to enforce 
accountability. 
Keeping all of the above in mind, regarding efforts to track extractive industry 
revenues, it appears possible to track mining revenues at a macro level, 
although, as pointed out above, it is difficult to work out if these are the proper, or 
correct amounts to which local areas are entitled by law. It also seems possible 
to audit mining payments to the government; however, there are some limitations 
around the fluctuating price of gold and specific booking/exchange rate 
calculations between companies and the government203 (also mentioned earlier; 
see Section 3). It seems that revenues from oil can be well-tracked; however, 
accountability over the management of oil is weak, as illustrated above. 
Notably, in cases where budget data was not available and in cases where civil 
society sought to pursue maladministration, there was general agreement among 
civil society organizations that broadcasting issues in the media were the most 
effective means to garner some response from the state (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Charts highlighting survey responses showing the importance of 
the media in Ghana when contesting access to budget data and when 
seeking formal sanction 
 
                                                
202	  ISODEC,	  Programme	  Budgeting	  in	  the	  Education,	  Health	  and	  Water	  Sectors	  in	  Ghana.	  
203	  Ghana	  Chamber	  of	  Mines,	  “Publish	  What	  You	  Pay”	  (2013).	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Source: Research survey. 
 
To conclude: Regarding CSO influence, it appears that groups have been more 
demonstrably successful at influencing policy and legislation than they have been 
at driving allocations of extractive industry revenues through the budget. 
Challenges in both cases appear to lie with the extent to which power is 
centralized within the executive and with the dysfunction within Parliament, which 
affords the executive excessive control over budget allocations and which allows 
laws to be circumvented.  
In terms of efforts to address budget leakage or generate accountability 
responses in individual cases, it appears that these have been frustrated in many 
ways. These efforts only appear to be successful when implemented at a macro 
scale. As soon as efforts are made to trace the budget to the point of 
expenditure, they become compromised by capacity challenges and access to 
records. Notably, such efforts have not proved very successful, or transformative, 
when implemented as audit processes. Instead, they seem most effective when 
used as a means to build broader capacity in administering the budget. In this 
respect, successful accountability responses appear to be reliant on the 
alignment of other contextual factors (such as the help of whistleblowers or 
scandals at election time). 
It seems then that maladministration continues in particular areas not because 
civil society does not have the reach, know-how, and resources to identify, 
monitor, and analyze—as is often claimed. Rather, there is a culture of impunity 
across public administration where disincentives for accountability and non-
systematization of checks and balances are institutionalized. To date, CSO 
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successes appear relatively isolated, having had limited success in influencing 
this process in a way that meaningfully reforms power. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
This report has sought to understand the means by which revenues from 
extractive industries are captured by the state as well as how decisions regarding 
the allocation of those revenues are made. In doing so, the work has sought to 
understand the institutional relationships that are meant to ensure that these 
processes are undertaken in a manner that is accountable to the citizens whose 
interests lie in the effective capture and judicious use of the wealth those 
resources produce. 
While Ghana remains heavily dependent on natural resources, and appears to 
be developing them effectively to the ends (in the long run) of achieving GDP 
growth, the country shows worrying signs that returns on that growth, in terms of 
improving human development, are diminishing. Although such broad economic 
processes have many drivers, institutional barriers to the effective collection and 
management of revenues accruing from natural resources are key. Despite 
significant gains in democratic conduct in Ghana, at the heart of the problem 
appears to be a relationship between the branches of government in which the 
powers of the executive dominate those of the Parliament. This situation appears 
to be driven in part by capacity problems, but it is also a result of certain laws 
biasing the formal powers of the executive. In addition, there seems to be a 
problem of skewed incentives within Parliament whereby personal advancement 
within the political class results from acquiescing to the demands of the ruling 
party, rather than holding it to account.  
The result of such a lopsided power relationship is that additional horizontal 
oversight institutions are also rendered dysfunctional. With their leadership 
appointed by the president, conflicts of interest arise in these institutions’ holding 
government to account. Likewise, because these institutions lack resources, as 
well as investigative and prosecutorial authority, they have to rely on Parliament 
to be their champions. In a context where Parliament is dysfunctional, these 
institutions are rendered largely ineffective, or only effective in instances where 
their findings galvanize public outrage. Likewise, dominance of the executive has 
allowed for the independence of the judiciary to be compromised, rendering the 
function of the oversight institutions even more limited.  
The outcome is that where laws and policies do exist for the purposes of 
ensuring the judicious management of natural resource wealth, contests over the 
interpretation of the law are not satisfactorily resolved. This outcome combines 
with insufficient oversight to drive high levels of ministerial discretion in the 
management of these resources. Accountability within such a system moves 
away from being manifest between citizens and elected officials and is instead 
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manifest in informal terms between members of the executive and aspirants to 
such positions. The result is that access to, and control over, national resources 
is leveraged to maintain positions of authority within this informal system, which 
in turn drives highly inefficient (from the perspective of improving social welfare) 
decisions over how resources should be managed.  
Within this context, articulating the extent to which civil society efforts can be 
most effective is a complicated task. The following are three possible ways to 
drive improvements in revenue management: 
1. Advocating for better designed oversight institutions 
2. Campaigning around findings of scandalous maladministration that can 
be leveraged toward achieving some sort of sanction  
3. Advocating for increased budget allocations and then attempting to follow 
the money to ensure that execution drives a real distribution of resources  
 
Option 1 seems plausible, as in the case of the PRMA and creation of PIAC. That 
said, the success that such efforts might have if they focus on making sure that 
oversight bodies are independent, funded, and have both prosecutorial and 
investigative power is yet to be seen.  
Option 2 has likewise proved effective, so long as advocates think strategically 
about the moments in which they try to galvanize scandals so as to take 
advantage of powerful allies or auspicious timing.  
The case for option 3 is hard to discern. In terms of affecting budget priorities, 
while some results appear initially positive, determining causation is difficult. 
Further to this, the overall content of the budget suggests that civil society 
influence is limited. In terms of following the money and tracking budget 
expenditures, while these approaches may have had some success at a macro 
level (in terms of allocations), efforts to audit expenditure to the local level face 
significant challenges around access to financial records.  
Notably, the theory of change behind options 1 and 2 is that one can affect long-
term governance dynamics by shifting the incentives of decision-makers as a 
result of rendering them susceptible to sanction. That being said, this work 
suggests that so long as the balance of power remains in the hands of the 
executive branch, political advancement among elected officials will continue to 
happen more effectively by acquiescing to government demands than by 
opposing them. In such a context, one can expect individuals to simply risk 
unlikely sanction rather than certain exclusion from the political class. As such, 
an institutionalized lack of accountability is likely to persist. 
In this regard, option 3 is worth further reflection. For while options 1 and 2 are 
about changing incentives through sanction, option 3 (especially if it reformulates 
the focus away from an audit) is about engaging citizens more closely in the 
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governance process. Because the dynamic that appears to sit at the root of 
accountability challenges in Ghana pertains to the concentration of power within 
the executive branch, such efforts might prove effective at driving accountability 
in ways that look beyond the horizon of direct campaign achievements. For only 
by engaging the citizenry in the politics of allocation and accountability can the 
executive’s current ability to skew the incentives of oversight bodies be 
effectively challenged.  
With the above in mind, a final possibility for reform might stem from more direct 
efforts at politicizing good governance. This approach includes generating a 
broad-based understanding of how politics is supposed to work, why good 
governance is necessary, and how it actually works. Only through this process, 
when popular legitimacy is tied to the effective ability to perform duties 
appropriate to one’s political office, will the balance of power be pulled away from 
the executive branch as incentives start to align with good governance rather 
than with political acquiescence.  
How exactly this change might be achieved is uncertain. Concepts of 
governance—and descriptions of institutional responsibilities—are complicated 
and often dry subjects. Politicizing these is therefore a tricky task. That said, 
popular discontent around corruption is already manifest, and rhetorical 
commitments to addressing it are already part of the platform of political 
legitimacy. What is needed is a public unpacking of this notion so that this 
popular sentiment can be focused on correcting systemically skewed incentives 
within the political class.   
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APPENDIX 
Interviews (Accra) 
 
Name Position   Date 
Major Daniel Sowa Ablorh-Quarcoo Chairman, PIAC April 16, 2015 
Mohammed Amin Adam Executive director, ACEP April 9, 2015
Anonymous Former minister, expert on EI issues Jan. 22, 2015 
Anonymous NDC MP Jan. 17,2015 
Anonymous Former senior civil  
 servant, Ministry of Finance  Jan. 17, 2015  
Anonymous NDC minister Jan. 13, 2015 
Anonymous DCE, Northern Region  Jan. 9, 2015 
Anonymous Former NPP Cabinet minister, MP Dec. 20, 2014 
Anonymous  Former PIAC member, NDC minister Dec. 19, 2014 
Samuel K.B. Asante  Former deputy attorney general Jan. 14, 2015          
Hon. George Gyan Baffour Former minister of finance, current MP Dec. 10, 2014 
Samual Codjoe Executive director, APRM Dec. 17, 2014 
Newman Kwadwo Kusi Executive director, Institute  
 for Fiscal Studies  Jan. 11, 2015 
Hon. Mathew Nymdam MP, Kpandai Dec. 15, 2014 
Hon. Anthony Akoto Osei  NPP MP Jan. 20, 2015 
Linda Ofori-Kwafo Executive secretary, Ghana  
 Anti-Corruption Coalition  April 16, 2015 
Richard Quanyson Commissioner, Commissioner on Human  
 Rights and Administrative Justice  Dec. 9, 2014  
Hon. Nii Lantey Vanderpuye Deputy minister, Ministry of Local  
 Government and Rural Development  Dec. 12, 2014  
George Yeboah NDC candidate Dec. 15, 2014 
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